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DISABILITY, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS OF 
PROGRESSIVE AND RETROGRESSIVE LOGIC IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLASSIFICATIONt 
Anita Silvers* 
Michael Ashley Stein** 
This Article compares'current disability jurisprudence with the development of sex 
equality jurisprudence in the area of discrimination. It demonstrates that current 
disability law resembles the abandoned, sexist framework for determining sex 
equality and argues that disability equality cases should receive similar analysis 
as the more progressive, current sex equality standard. As such, the Article at-
tempts to synthesize case law (14th Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence) 
and statutory law (Title VII and the ADA) into a comprehensive overview of the 
state of current disability law viewed within the context of discrimination law in 
general. 
INTRODUCTION 
Disability as a classification for equal protection stands at a 
jurisprudential crossroads. :rhe path traveled by the Supreme 
Court in the handful of cases addressing individuals with disabili-
ties, whether Justice Holmes's infamous justification of state 
imposed sterilization on the ground that "[t]hree generations of 
imbeciles are enough,"1 or its more recent holdings interpreting 
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1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207 (1927). 
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provlSlons under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) ,2 is 
analogous to the course pursued by the Court more than half a 
century ago when adjudicating women's rights.3 
Specifically, the Court adopted biological classifications for dis-
ability and sex,4 respectively, that were rooted in empirically 
incorrect stereotypes established by social convention, rather than 
based in fact. 5 Yet over the intervening half century, limitations on 
women's participation in society, based on unfounded stereotypes 
about their biological differences, have come to be viewed as un-
acceptable.6 Enabling this transformation was a shift in the legal 
conceptualization of sex-based roles, facilitated by the Supreme 
Court's adoption of an empirically grounded methodology for 
claims about women and their abilities. For instance, the 1973 
Frontiero v. Richardson7 decision held as a general empirically veri-
fied proposition that one's sex was frequently unrelated "to ability 
to perform or contribute to society. "8 The Court's 1982 ruling in 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan9 observed that certain sex-
based differential treatment was not factually verifiable as related 
to an important governmental interest and was thus merely a codi-
fication of empirically unsubstantiated social conventions.10 As a 
result, notions that automatically assigned women to certain roles, 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12001 (1994). The Court's ADA opinions are set forth below in Part 
III.B. 
3. Discussed below in Part I. 
4. The term "sex" refers to biological difference, as opposed to "gender" which refers 
to assigned social roles. See SUSAN S.M. EDWARDS, SEX AND GENDER IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 
(1996); Katherine O'Donovan, Legal Construction of Sex and Gender, in SouRCEBOOK ON 
FEMINIST jURISPRUDENCE 171 (1997). A more general perspective is provided in KATHARINE 
T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAw: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (2d 
ed. 1998). 
5. A strong analogy also extends to race. Nevertheless, popular treatment of sex and 
disability (as opposed to race) dovetails more closely in that they are grounded in paternal-
ism rather than in animus, see generaUy Michael Ashley Stein, Empluying People with Disabilities: 
Some Cautionary Thoughts for a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABIL-
ITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAw, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
REsEARCH 51 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) [hereinafter Stein, Empluying People With Dis-
abilities]. As such, the majority of our assertions about disability classification are formulated 
through comparisons with the historical treatment of women. 
6. See generaUy jUDITH A BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD 
EQUALITY FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT (2d ed. 1996); ELEANOR FLEXNER, CEN-
TURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1975); 
ALBERT KRICHMAR, THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1848-1970 
(1972); WOMEN's RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Winston E. 
Langley & Vivian C. Fox eds., 1994). 
7. 411 u.s. 677 (1973). 
8. !d. at 686. 
9. 458 u.s. 718, 718 (1982). 
10. Ironically, the issue in Hogan was a policy of the state-sponsored university limiting 
enrollment in its nursing program to women. !d. 
FALL 2001-WINTER 2002] Disability and the Supreme Court 83 
and precluded their participation in others based on stereotypes of 
their deficient competence, have been replaced by a standard 
which assumes that women as a class are as competent as men, 
notwithstanding that there are sub-classes of women who are not 
competent to perform some of the same tasks as most men. 11 
Thus, for over the past half century, jurisprudential methodology 
for deciding what properties are, in fact, collectively characteristic of 
women has progressed by adopting an empirically-based framework 
for making these judgments. No similar transformation has ad-
vanced jurisprudential methodology in regard to the disability 
classification. A medical account of disability, 12 one that resembles 
outdated medical views about the inherent frailty of women's bod-
ies and instability of their minds and emotions, 13 remains 
influential in legal thinking. This persistence occurs despite 
mounting evidence, increasingly acknowledged in political, cul-
tural, and academic realms, of the errors in equating biological 
atypicality with inherent limitation and inability. 14 This evidence 
11. An explanatory foomote on nomenclature is warranted. Throughout this Article, 
we give "incompetent" its common meaning of not possessing the necessary ability or capac-
ity, rather than its specialized legal meaning of not possessing the ability or capacity to make 
decisions in one's own interest. We do, however, borrow the contextualization of compe-
tence from its legal usage. Thus, for us, competence is to be assessed relative to the kinds of 
activities in which an individual proposes to engage. For example, L.C., the plaintiff in 
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), which we discuss in greater detail in Part III, was com-
petent to live in the community and receive medical services there. Some disability 
advocates may fear the implications for seriously disabled individuals, especially for mentally 
retarded people, of disconnecting the disability classification from characterizations of 
incompetence. To the contrary, doing so permits our thinking about these groups to ex-
pand by attending to how they express their personal agency. For instance, in EEOC v. CEC 
Entertainment, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (W.D. Wis. March 14, 2000), an ADA em-
ployment action against the Chuck E. Cheese's restaurant chain, plaintiff was a retarded 
speech-impaired worker. Nevertheless, the court permitted the case to turn on evidence of 
the plaintiff's competent execution of his work and his competent choice to hold a job. I d. 
at *2, 15-17. 
12. Particularly notable among the voluminous literature describing this model of dis-
ability are the writings of Paul K. Longmore and Harlan Hahn. A succinct exegesis is 
provided in Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution 
of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341 (1993). 
13. See generally Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Is-
sues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97 (1994). 
14. See Joetta L. Sack, State Board Candidate Sets out to Defy Expectations, 17 EDUCATION 
WEEK 36 (May 20, 1998), (recounting how Abbey Marie Sanchez, a college graduate with 
Down Syndrome, ran for election to the New Mexico Board of Education); Michael Arkush, 
'Life' Fulfills her Dream, L.A. TIMES, March 28, 1992, at F1 (describing the soap opera acting 
career of Andrea Friedman, a person with Down Syndrome). A good overview of what life 
with Down Syndrome may be like is provided, autobiographically, by jASON KINGSLEY & 
MITCHELL LEVITZ, COUNT Us IN: GROWING UP WITH DOWN SYNDROME (1994). Although 
generally sanguine, the authors disagree with each other over the extent to which social 
awareness has improved. 
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has not overcome the continuing authority granted to the concep-
tual conventions of welfarist legal categories which cast people 
with disabilities in the role of social incompetents who are charac-
teristically dependent upon public assistance. 15 As a result of these 
static underlying assumptions, the methodology for assessing dis-
ability as a classification still depends on out-of-date notions rooted 
in empirically unsubstantiated social conventions. 
One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon was the 
Supreme Court's 1985 decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc., 16 where the Court explicitly relied on custom and an 
existing welfarist statute to characterize the disability classifica-
tion.17 The Court failed to notice that the statute in question was 
based on unsubstantiated assumptions about disabled people's 
limitations and found it unnecessary to rule whether the permit 
requirement was facially invalid when the mentally retarded are 
involved. 18 The effect of allowing this retrogressive method of 
equating biological anomaly with generalized limitation has been 
the imposition of a disability classification that presupposes in-
19 
competence. 
The legislative history and findings of the ADA clearly demon-
strate that Congress intended to rebut the assumptions underlying 
the Cleburne decision and establish for the disabled an antidis-
crimination classification methodology analogous to that applied 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. 473 u.s. 432 (1985). 
17. In Cleburne, the Court ruled that "the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental re· 
tardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial 
review." /d. at 442. Consequently, statutes and practices that disadvantage mentally retarded 
people by treating them differently do not have to meet the standard of substantially fur-
thering an important governmental purpose. Instead, the classification need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose because individuals in the "group affected ... 
have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to imple-
ment." /d. at 441. While it is true that the different standards of scrutiny partially account for 
the different ways in which the Court treats the sex and disability classifications, we argue 
that the Court's basis for applying different standards is flawed. We argue that in Cleburne 
and in subsequent decisions that deal with the disability classification, the Court uses retro-
gressive thinking, reminiscent of its earlier mistaken thinking about the characteristics of 
women, to mistakenly attribute characteristics that would justify disadvantageous differential 
treatment to the population of the disability classification. If the Court's thinking about the 
distinguishing characteristics of the population of the disability classification is mistaken, as 
we argue here, its basis for denying that differential treatment of the classified group need 
not meet the heightened scrutiny standard of substantially furthering an important gov-
ernmental purpose is undercut. 
18. /d. at 447-50. The Cleburne decision, and its consequences, are discussed in Part II. 
For a more thorough treatment of the artificial nature of limitations, see Anita Silvers, Fur-
mal justice, in ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON jUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (I998). 
19. We elaborate on this point in Parts I and II. 
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to groups differentiated on the basis of race or sex.20 Nevertheless, 
Congress was negligent when drafting the statute, for it adopted 
without alteration (in part as the result of a political compromise 
among cross-disability rights groups and groups that represent 
people with specific disabilities) 21 the definition of disability from 
the Rehabilitation Act.22 As a result, although the definition itself 
was meant to be neutral, that is, not read within the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the legal-cultural accretion of established wel-
farist classification continues to influence post-ADA Supreme 
Court decisions. Accordingly, the prevailing characterization of 
people with disabilities as a group is one ofincompetence.2g 
The current disability classification, therefore, is analogous to 
the retrogressive conceptualization of sex that is now acknowl-
edged as "outmoded." The Supreme Court's disparate 
jurisprudence regarding the constitutional classification of groups 
of biologically different individuals is not, however, unavoidable. 
As a matter of logical consistency and out of concern for judicial 
uniformity, the Court could acknowledge and amend the retro-
gressive methodology that continues to be applied to people with 
the biological differences that historically have been called dis-
abilities. 
Specifically, the Court could hold that when examining statutes 
or practices affecting the disabled, courts should begin from the 
same baseline utilized for assessing the rights of women. 
Subsequent examination of whether disabled individuals in 
general, as distinct from a carefully drawn and substantiated sub-
category of the classification, are biologically unable to execute 
particular social functions would the·n be grounded in an 
empirical analysis rather than reliant upon social convention. Such 
action would be in line with the judicial conservatism typifying the 
majority of the current Justices,24 for it would compel 
methodological consistency in the Court's treatment of groups that 
20. Discussed below in Part III. 
21. See generaUy Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991); 
Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 
TEMP. L. REv. 471 (1991). 
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974). The tripartate definition is also utilized in the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968). 
23. See infra Part lll. 
24. See Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Ca-
cophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995) 
(criticizing the Court's unquestioning reliance "on the abstract meaning of a particular 
word or phrase"). 
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are candidates for constitutional protection from discrimination. 
Nor would application of this standard require the Court to 
engage in dramatic social engineering, for only empirically proven 
premises about the disabled would be upheld. 
Thus, we propose a uniform methodology that appeals to fact 
rather than to custom. While some legal scholars hold that all legal 
categories are nothing more than social construction,25 we believe 
that no legal classification should impose unsubstantiated or 
stereotypical beliefs about the definitive characteristics of members 
of the class, or beliefs that cannot be generalized, even if such be-
liefs are customary or culturally embedded.26 Our point here being 
strictly methodological, we have not attempted to construct the 
disability class or determine its attributes.27 We treat these aspects 
elsewhere, with particular attention to the analogues between dis-
ability and genetic identity and race in the social construction of 
. classifications.28 For now, simply as a matter of juridical uniformity, 
we assert that the criteria for establishing whether a classification 
of citizens is accurately drawn should be applied in an unbiased 
and logically consistent manner. 
We demonstrate that the methodology utilized by the Court in 
regard to the disability classification does not meet even this stan-
dard. Instead, the Court continues to rely upon an outmoded 
framework that is incompatible with the model they apply to 
25. For example, Kimberle Crenshaw argues that even classifications meant to protect 
against social prejudice are not themselves free from bias because they are artifacts of a 
biased society. Thus, individuals who fall into the intersect of two minority categories, such 
as black women, may not be protected by legislation designed for either group because they 
are situated differently from white women with respect to suffering from sex-based harms, 
and differently from black men with respect to suffering from employment-related harms. 
See generaUy Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, 
Reft:mn, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. 
L. REv. 1331 (1988). 
26. Thus, we agree with commentators asserting the social origins of many categories, 
but diverge from them to the extent that we believe classifications can and ought to be 
based upon empirical fact. See generaUy CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE ROOTS (1988); Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Con-
struction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1237; Ian F. Haney Lop.ez, The Social 
Construction of Race: Some Obseroations on musions, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 1 (1994). 
27. We also do not enter into the debate over the proper role of the Court in inter-
preting congressional intent. For differing accounts of what that role ought to be, see 
generaUy WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
(2000); AI!NERj. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1997); Ruth Colker &James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 
MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001 ). 
28. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic Dis-
crimination, 55 VANDERBILT LAw REviEW (forthcoming). The authors of this Article will pursue 
the analogue to race in a future collaboration. 
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women's biological differences. Consequently, we suggest an ap-
proach through which the Supreme Court can amend its 
retrogressive methodology and achieve jurisprudential consistency. 
Part I of this Article compares concepts of discrimination arising 
from individuals' sex and disabilities as expressed in two con-
trasted Supreme Court opinions. Although facially dissimilar, both 
cases were governed by views restricting the social participation of 
certain individuals based on their group identities. 
Part II continues this examination by explicating and critiquing 
the Court's classification of disability in Cleburne. This framework 
established incompetence as a presumptive characteristic of mem-
bership in the disability classification. 
Part III describes Congress's intent to respond to the Cleburne 
framework in discrimination classification, as evidenced in its for-
mulation of the ADA. In spite of this objective, Congress's 
wholesale adoption of the Rehabilitation Act's disability definition 
into the ADA classification imported an inappropriate conceptu-
alization of disability into civil rights law.29 While the definition 
itself is carefully neutral, the ADA has inherited not only the defi-
nition's language but also the social and juridical interpretations 
that contextualize it in the context of the Rehabilitation Act. The 
repercussions of that bequest are demonstrated by the post-ADA 
decisions wherein the Court has continued to apply the Cleburne 
framework which presumes incompetence as the dominant charac-
teristic of a disability classification. As a result, judicial treatment of 
disability as a classification diverges illogically from its handling of 
other constitutional classifications. 
Part IV advocates that the Court correct its logically inconsistent 
classification of biologically different groups by applying a uniform 
methodology. Such emendation will not result in special protec-
tions for the disabled. Rather, it will extend to that group the same 
model of factual enquiry applied to other classifications correlated 
with biological difference. 
In conclusion, Part V defends the Court against the charge of 
mistaking socially conventional classifications for natural kinds and 
argues that the Court's retrogressive logic is prompted by exactly 
the reverse error. RectifYing such error requires commitment to 
the principle that empirical reality overrides the stipulation of so-
cial conventions, as well as willingness to study how the general 
facts about the capabilities of disabled people have evolved over 
time. 
29. See infra Part III. 
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. I. COMPARING CONCEPTS OF SEX 
AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 
[VoL. 35:1&2 
In Goesart v. Cleary,30 the Supreme Court upheld as obvious31 the 
constitutionality of a Michigan statute requiring that bartenders be 
licensed but prohibiting the licensing of women as "barmaids,"32 
unless they were either the spouses or daughters of male liquor 
establishment owners.33 The Court deemed Michigan reasonable 
in excluding all women lacking patronage from close male family 
members from this profession.34 Despite acknowledging that the 
preceding (depression and war) years had brought "vast" social 
and legal changes to women's status,35 the Court held that to re-
strict a profes'!>ion mainly to men by state action does not violate 
the Constitution because equal protection does not mean equal 
treatment for individuals whose situations are "different in fact or 
• • ,36 
opm10n. 
No matter how adroit a woman might be at pouring drinks, or 
how competent at tallying sums, to the Court her situation could 
not help but be different from a man's.37 For the justices, the mere 
thought of a female dispensing drinks evoked the image of a 
"sprightly and ribald" Shakespearean alewife.38 They believed that 
the mere presence of a female dispensing intoxicating beverages 
behind a bar could not help but raise "moral and social problems" 
which the state intended to prevent.39 Only the "oversight" of a 
male with special interest in both the woman's welfare and the pro-
tection of bar room property, "assured through ownership of a bar 
30. 335 u.s. 464 (1948). 
31. Justice Frankfurter opined that the issue raised "need not detain us long," for it "is 
one of those rare instances where to state the question is in effect to answer it." I d. at 465. 
32. Presumably the female equivalent of a male bartender, the Court refers to this job 
description as "a historic calling," once essential to the "social life of England." Id. Ironically, 
although this term does not appear in the gender-neutral language of the Michigan statute, 
1945 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 133, Sec. 19a, it is also utilized by Goesart's counsel. See Appel-
lants' Brief, Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (on file with authors). 
33. The statute applied to cities having populations of 50,000 or more. Goesart, 335 
U.S. at 465 (citing 1945 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 133, § 19a). 
34. /d. at 466. 
35. These advances are described by the Court as "[t]he fact that women may now 
have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge 
in vices that men have long practiced ... ." /d. 
36. /d. (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) ). 
37. See id. at 465. 
38. ld. 
39. /d. at 466. 
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by a barmaid's husband or father,"40 could be trusted to minimize 
"hazards" otherwise confronting an unprotected barmaid.41 
Because the line drawn by the Michigan legislature was not 
wholly lacking reason, 42 the Court held that the disadvantage that 
the statute imposed on most women did not call its constitutional-
ity into question. However possibly "unchivalrous" or exclusionary 
it might be,43 equal protection consideration could not reach this 
purpose44 because the state had a rational interest both in protect-
ing women from the limitations of their ability to defend 
themselves 45 and in protecting the public from disruptions pro-
voked by the mere presence of women in a potentially raucous, 
uncontrolled environment.46 
Fifty years later, the Supreme Court first addressed the ADA in 
Bragdon v. Abbott.47 In Bragdon, the Court held that Abbott, an HIV-
positive dental patient, was disabled within the terms of the statute 
and therefore protected from disability discrimination. While the 
ultimate significance of the ruling has been subject to varying in-
terpretations,48 the assumptions underlying the decision are 
revealing. The Court found that Abbott, although asymptomatic, 
was disabled. The ADA's application of the Equal Protection 
Clause's general requirement of access to public accommodation 
compelled Bragdon to fill Abbott's cavities in his office rather than 
in a hospital setting,49 unless objective medical evidence confirmed 
Bragdon's trepidation that treating Abbott in the office as other 
patients were treated fell beyond the ADA's reach because it 
40. !d. 
41. !d. 
42. The distinction between requiring women to withdraw from tending bar but not 
from serving as waitresses, was likewise challenged on Constitutional grounds, but summa-
rily dismissed. !d. at 465 ( 1948). 
43. Presumably the legislature's desire was to give returning male veterans a monop-
oly on the occupation of bartending. For an account of the role of women in the labor force 
during World War II, see PENNY COLMAN, ROSIE THE RIVETER: WOMEN WORKING ON THE 
HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II (1995); SHERNA BERGER GLUCK, ROSIE THE RIVETER REVIS-
ITED: WOMAN, THE WAR, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1987). 
44. Goesart, 335 U.S. at 466. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. 
47. 524 u.s. 624 (1998). 
48. A thoughtful treatment of this issue is pursued by Mark Kelman, Does Disability 
Status Matter?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAw FOR 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). Two 
other especially good analyses are Samuel A Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, 
86 VA. L. REv. 397 (2000), and Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative 
Capability, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1279 (2000). 
49. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629. 
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constituted a "direct threat" to his welfare.50 As to this last matter, 
the Court remanded the case for a factual finding, but this action 
was largely pro forma, for the Center for Communicable Diseases 
and the American Dental Association were on record as finding 
ordinarily available office setting precautions to be adequate. 51 
Why, then, did Abbott's biological difference, an asymptomatic 
HIV infection, classify her as disabled?52 The Court found that it 
substantially limited a maJor life activity, reproduction. 53 
There was no question, however, regarding Abbot's biological 
ability to reproduce, which even individuals with fully developed 
AIDS can do. As in Goesart, the issue in Bragdon turned on the so-
cial import of a biological difference: in Goesart the social 
implications of the difference between bar patrons' responses to 
female and male physiology; in Bragdon the social implications of 
the difference between being infected or not infected by the HIV 
virus. 
Central to the Court's reasoning is not that Abbott could not 
reproduce, but rather that she ought not to do so, for fear of 
transmitting her infection to either a male partner or to their off-
spring.54 For, although conception and childbirth were "not 
impossible" for individuals with HIV, they were unquestionably 
"dangerous to the public health," thus meeting the ADA's defini-
tion of a substantial limitation. 55 The Court wrote as if Abbott had 
recourse only to traditional methods of reproduction,56 and there-
fore was unavoidably subject to the specific risks incurred through 
50. I d. at 648. 
51. I d. at 650--52. 
52. Even more oddly, why was a connection made between the unrelated acts of re-
production to cavity filling? I d. at 641. 
53. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. This in itself is interesting for it touches upon the highly 
contested (albeit unresolved) issue of whether infertility ought to be covered by insurance 
so far as the ADA is concerned. See generaUy Stephen T. Kaminski, Must Empluyers Pay for Via-
gra? An Americans with Disabilities Analysis Post-Bragdon and Sutton, 4 DEPAUL]. HEALTH CARE 
L. 73 (2000). On the broader issue of the effects of the ADA upon insurance provision, see 
Mary R. Anderlik & Wendy J. Wilkinson, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Managed Care, 
37 Hous. L. REv. 1163 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Individual Rights and Reasonable Ac-
commodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Insurance and the ADA, 46 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 915 (1997). 
54. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-40 (1998). 
55. !d. at 641. 
56. See generaUy Michelle R. King & Beth S. Herr, The Consequences and Implications of a 
Case-By-Case Analysis Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Gay 
Men and Lesbians Post Bragdon, 8 LAw & SEx 531 (1998). Moreover, Kelman wonders 
whether a hypothetically post-menopausal Abbott would no longer be considered disabled 
and therefore will be unprotected against disability discrimination. He asks whether it is 
Abbott's (and other disabled people's) disability status rather than their being subjected to 
stigmatizing treatment that really matters when delineating discrimination. See Kelman, 
supra note 48. 
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this method.57 Moreover, the Court adduced "economic and legal 
consequences" pertaining to her limitation. These included the 
"added costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance, 
and long-term health care for the child who must be examined 
and, tragic to think, treated for the infection,"58 as well as the fact 
that certain state laws prohibit HIV-infected people from engaging 
in sexual relations, regardless of their partners' consent.59 Thus, it 
was not Abbott's biological difference, but a socio-economic as-
sessment of that difference, that limited Abbott and was a 
definitive component of her disability. 
Facially, the connection between these opinions may seem as far 
apart as the half century intervening between their decisions. Fur-
ther, in the earlier case, beliefs that take a class's biological 
difference as a proxy for a social limitation defeat claims to similar 
treatment, while in the latter, claims to similar treatment are sub-
stantiated precisely because of such a limitation.60 Yet uniting these 
two opinions are similar underlying notions regarding the relation 
between socially relevant competence and biological difference. 
Central to both Goesart and Bragdon is identification of a class 
that historically has been deprived of opportunities because its 
members are imagined to be so vulnerable as to require and de-
serve protection from the state. Of note in this regard is the 
practice of limiting the class in general because of the deficits of 
some of its individual members. Thus, although some women are 
unlikely to evoke raucous reactions in men, and there also are 
women capable of quelling drunken disturbances, the Goesart 
Court believed women to be a general risk to themselves and the 
public if they try to preside over barrooms.61 It therefore held that 
it was rational to discourage them from doing so.62 Similarly, 
57. The Court first asserted that an HIV infected woman "who tries to conceive a child 
imposes on the man a significant risk of becoming infected," and then cited various statistics 
on the probability of HIV transmission. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. 
58. /d. at 641. 
59. /d. 
60. In ADA cases where plaintiffs seek access to the workplace, the Court's endorse-
ment of biological difference as a proxy for social limitation plays out as it did for the 
plaintiffs in Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). In the two nonemployment ADA cases it 
has heard, the Court found for disabled plaintiffs. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). On the other hand, in all of the employment-
related cases, the plaintiffs were denied relief. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). We analyze the remaining ADA case, Cleveland v. 
Policy Mgmt. Sys., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), in Section IV. 
61. See Goesart, 335 U.S. at 466. 
62. /d. at 467. 
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although some HIV-positive women can reproduce without trans-
mitting their infection, the Court believed that women with HIV 
generally risk causing harm if they try to reproduce.63 Even evi-
dence of antiretroviral therapy lowering the risk of prenatal 
transmission to eight percent did not sway the Court's belief.64 
Consequently, the Court appears to have concluded that not re-
producing is a rational limitation for HIV-positive people.65 
In Goesart, the defense of such limitation is direct. In Bragdon, it 
is more subtle. Nevertheless, Bragdon, as forcefully as Goesart, pre-
sumes that an individual is significantly limited in her ability to 
carry out a common activity if her biological differences make her 
engagement in the activity a risk to herself or others. The same 
kind of assumption that seemed so reasonable to the Court fifty 
years ago as a basis for declaring women to be substantially limited 
continues to seem a reasonable basis to the present Court for de-
claring women with HIV to be substantially limited. In both cases, 
the overt issue is whether a class' members are capable of perform-
ing certain common functions, but the underlying issue is whether 
the state has a rational interest in their not doing so. 
The persistence of this line of reasoning should not be a sur-
prise. Historically, courts have addressed the constitutionality of 
limiting opportunity for classes delineated in terms of biological 
differences by considering two related questions. First, does the 
class members' biological difference relate to or signify some type 
of "reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday 
world,"66 so that class members generally need special protection? 
Second, does the class members' reduced ability to cope and func-
tion usually place the public in need of special protection?67 
Answering these questions turns on facts about the conditions un-
der which class members or the public need special protection, the 
frequency with which these conditions occur, and the degree to 
which they can be averted. The questions are, therefore, empirical. 
Consequently, courts should consider them to be open ques-
tions, with answers to be determined by establishing factual truths 
about the class, rather than as questions foreclosed by reliance on 
customary ideas about the disabled. What concerns us is the error 
of the Court, when dealing with disability, in preempting answers 
to these questions without examining the facts. This same error of 
reasoning led the Goesart Court to consider women's situation suf-
63. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 643. 
64. !d. at 641. 
65. !d. at 647-48. 
66. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985). 
67. !d. at 443-44. 
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ficiently different as to justify withdrawing from them the occupa-
tion of bartending. Despite acknowledging "vast changes" that had 
occurred during the war years in women's social and legal posi-
tion, the Goesart Court held that legislatures were not required "to 
reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards,"68 or "to 
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards"69 when drawing lines 
between the sexes. During the half-century that separates Bragdon 
from Goesart, closer attention to the facts about women developed 
a perspective from which the characterization of them in Goesart 
seems "archaic and stereotypic."70 
Fifty years later, very little, if anything, strikes us as a society as 
obviously warranting employment discrimination on the basis of 
sex. Accordingly, the Court has stated elsewhere that "the sex 
characteristic" does not reflect a woman's "ability to perform or 
contribute to society,"71 and that sex-based distinctions characteriz-
ing relative capabilities are "outmoded notions."72 Similar 
observations might be, but are not, made about disability. Neither 
Congress nor the Court consistently conceptualizes disability in a 
way that is constitutionally neutral. 
Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect" mem-
bers of one sex because they are presumed to suffer from an 
inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is 
illegitimate. 73 In contrast, there has been no emancipation for the 
disabled similar to the post-Goesart cultural emancipation of 
women that disconnects the notion of incompetence from biologi-
cal difference. 74 Disability discrimination law has been less 
successful than sex discrimination law, in part because it imports a 
conceptualization of disability from an area of law that has a pur-
pose quite different from discrimination law. 
The ADA's definition of disability is drawn directly from the Re-
habilitation Act'5 which, because it operates from the baseline that 
assumes disabled people need rehabilitation, presumes their in-
competence. Although the language of this definition is carefully 
68. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). 
69. /d. 
70. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1985). 
71. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
72. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. 
73. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725. 
74. See generaUy Stein, Empluying People with Disabilities, supra note 5, at 51 (Peter David 
Blanck ed., 2000); Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of 
Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY LJ. 247 (1994) [hereinafter Stein, From Crippled to Dis-
abled]. 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974). 
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neutral regarding their capabilities, the assumptions that pertain 
to disabled people's capability in the context of the Rehabilitation 
Act may affect the definition's interpretation in other contexts. 
The accretion of conceptualizations of disability drawn from social 
welfare law, and judicial interpretations that apply these conceptu-
alizations to civil rights law, frustrate the expression of an evolved 
understanding of disability that resembles the changes in our 
thinking about women by restraining misjudgments of incompe-
tence. This does not bode well for future interpretations of 
disability rights under the ADA, whether in the Court's recent 
opinion in University of Alabama v. Garrett, 76 or elsewhere. If the 
Court continues along its present course, operating from an as-
sumption that disability as a classification is defined by a 
characteristic of incompetence such that states are justified in ex-
cluding disabled individuals from opportunities as a valid means of 
protecting their interests, then the ground for requiring equality 
of opportunity for people with disabilities might be undercut. 
Moreover, if the Court persists in this approach, the path to 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection for individuals with dis-
abilities will be made so narrow, and their burden of 
disadvantageous conditions imposed or endorsed by the state so 
great, that opportunity will be a meaningless idea for them. In-
stead, the Court should, as it has in other instances, provide 
direction so that an historically oppressed class, denied the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate competence and reap its rewards, can be 
protected. Rather than defining the class in terms of limitation, we 
suggest that the Court adopt an alternative construction consistent 
with that applied to other groups of individuals with biological dif-
ferences. Our proposal for how the Supreme Court can extricate 
itself from the bind of retrogressive logic are set forth in Parts IV 
and V. First, however, we describe the Cleburne Court's establish-
ment of a disability classification in Part II, and Congress' inartful 
response, and the subsequent results in Part III. 
76. 535 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress's application of the ADA to states as 
employers was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment for reasons of sovereign 
immunity). The sovereign immunity issues are addressed with perspicacity in Ruth Colker, 
The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653 (2000), which offers a four-part framework 
for determining when Congress has abrogated state sovereignty in a constitutionally appro-
priate manner. More theoretical, and equally ingenious, is Deborah Hellman, The Expressive 
Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 U. MINN. L. REv. I (2000), which argues that the litmus test 
for whether a given state enactment violates equal protection is "the meaning or expressive 
content of the law or policy at issue." /d. at 2. 
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II. THE DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION AND 
THE CLEBURNE DOCTRINE 
95 
A clear illustration of the Supreme Court's reliance upon cus-
tom and existing welfarist statutes to shape the disability 
classification as a presumption of incompetence is the framework 
it established in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 77 one of 
the few pre-ADA cases to succeed in deploying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the "benefit" of the disabled. 
In Cleburne, a Texas town required special use zoning permits for 
group homes for people with mental retardation, 78 but not for 
housing the same number of unrelated unimpaired people, such 
as in a boarding house, apartment, fraternity house, or convales-
cent home.79 Further, the special permit process required 
agreement from all neighbors living within 200 feet of the pro-
posed home.80 Not all of the neighbors agreed to a proposal by the 
Cleburne Living Center (CLC) to set up a group home for people 
with mild to moderate cognitive limitations.81 Even had the permit 
been approved, it was good for one year only; therefore, after add-
ing a half bath and making other remodeling investments, the 
CLC would have had to reapply annually.82 
The permit was denied, and the CLC challenged the zoning 
process on Fourteenth Amendment grounds in federal district 
court. Stating that the zoning ordinance was rationally related to 
the state's legitimate interests, Judge Porter rejected the CLC's 
claim in an unpublished Memorandum Opinion.83 On appeal to 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a three judge panel disagreed, 
reasoning that mental retardation constituted a quasi-suspect cate-
gory, subject to intermediate equal protection analysis.84 The 
burden, therefore, shifted to the state to justify the necessity of the 
77. 473 u.s. 432 (1985). 
78. Zoning permits were also required for people with mental illness or addictions, 
and for correctional institutions. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 726 F.2d 191, 
194 (5th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Cleburne Appeal]. 
79. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447. 
80. /d. at 436 n.3. 
81. See Cleburne Appeal, 726 F.2d at 193-94. 
82. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at435-36. 
83. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., No. CA3-80-1576-F, slip. op. (N.D. 
Tex. 1984). 
84. The appellate court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the district court's 
opinion. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 726 F.2d 191, 195-98 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(holding "that mentally retarded persons are only a 'quasi-suspect' class and that laws dis-
criminating against the mentally retarded should be given intermediate scrutiny"). 
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classification which resulted in a higher barrier for unrelated peo-
ple with mental retardation who desired to live in the same house 
than for boarders, fraternity brothers, or convalescents.85 Upon 
review of the classification, it appeared to the Fifth Circuit that the 
policy had no substantial connection to an important interest of 
the city.86 That is, no important interest was served by a classifica-
tion that both imposed different treatment on people with mental 
retardation and, in doing so, disadvantaged them in comparison 
with boarders, fraternity brothers, convalescents, or similar groups 
of unrelated people who did not have to have neighbors' approval 
to share a house. 87 
Writing for a unanimous panel,88 Judge Goldberg found four 
major flaws with the city's zoning requirement.89 First, the city 
could have no substantial interest in responding to the private bi-
ases of the proposed group home's neighbors.90 This was because 
irrational prejudices could not provide "legitimate bases for dis-
crimination."91 Second, the city's claim that the classification 
helped rather than harmed mentally retarded people was not 
credible.92 Although the city claimed that students at the school 
across the street from the proposed group home might harass its 
occupants, that school already included a substantial number of 
mentally retarded individuals among its students, who presumably 
were not harassed.93 Third, despite the city's claim that the site's 
location in a five hundred year flood plain constituted a danger to 
the prospective mentally retarded residents of the group home, 
the court found the possibility of a flood too remote to justify the 
discrimination.94 Fourth, the city's concern with the density of oc-
cupancy of the proposed residence lacked merit.95 Moreover, the 
city never justified its apparent view that other people can live un-
der crowded conditions, but not the mentally retarded.96 In sum, 
the four reasons given by the city to justify imposing a (prohibi-
tively) high barrier on unrelated mentally retarded people who 
85. See id. at 196, 200--02. 
86. /d. at 200--02. 
87. /d. 
88. /d. at 192. 
89. /d. at 200--03. 
90. /d. at 202. 
91. /d. 
92. /d. 
93. /d. 
94. /d. 
95. /d. 
96. /d. 
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wished to share a house did not bear enough of a relation to any 
substantial legislative interests. 
Each of these reasons construed the barrier as being protective 
of putatively weak and incompetent people whom the state had an 
interest in sheltering. However, the city placed no similar barrier as 
a shelter for other groups of similarly situated people. For in-
stance, the ordinance explicitly permitted the presence of elderly 
or ill people and even assigned a group of identically disabled 
people-the mentally retarded students at the school-to be pre-
sent in the neighborhood. This inconsistency undercut the idea 
that the classification permitted the city to fulfill its obligation to 
protect its weak and incompetent citizens by imposing an espe-
cially high barrier against mentally retarded people taking up 
residence in the neighborhood.97 
The city, however, had also pursued a second line of argument, 
both at trial and on appeal. In addition to its interest in protecting 
retarded people, it also had an interest in protecting the public.98 
It claimed that the high barrier created by the special permit re-
quirement protected the pubic against disruptions occasioned by 
the presence of mentally retarded people.99 The city asserted that it 
was concerned about congestion on the streets, and about fire 
hazards. 100 The appellate court, however, was unconvinced by this 
assertion, because the city had failed to explain why residents of 
fraternity houses, apartment houses, boarding houses, and hospi-
tals were so less likely than mentally retarded people to occasion 
these evils. 101 The city had also expressed concern about the seren-
ity of the neighborhood, and about legal responsibility for actions 
the mentally retarded might take. 102 Again, this assertion was not 
deemed credible by the appellate court, for it was premised on the 
questionable claim that well-supervised mild to moderately re-
tarded people are more likely to create commotion and public 
safety problems in a residential neighborhood than unsupervised 
f . b th 103 ratermty ro ers. 
In sum, these inconsistencies undercut the idea that the special 
use permit requirement was necessary to enable the city to protect 
its citizens against predictable disruptions. The classification 
97. !d. at 201. 
98. !d. at 200. 
99. !d. 
100. /d. 
101. !d. at 201. 
102. !d. 
103. !d. 
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explicitly designated types of unrelated people, who were as likely 
as mentally retarded people to need to be sheltered or to be dis-
ruptive, as welcome in the neighborhood without special use 
permits. 104 Accordingly, although the holding of the district court 
was affirmed in part on other grounds, 105 the Fifth Circuit panel 
reversed the district court's holding that the zoning ordinance was 
constitutional. 106 Mter denial by the Fifth Circuit of both a petition 
and a suggestion for rehearing en bane, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. 107 
The Court affirmed one aspect of the appellate court's reason-
ing, while rejecting and vacating another. 108 All of the Justices 
agreed that the zoning ordinance deprived the prospective resi-
dents of the CLC group home of the equal protection of the 
laws. 109 This was because the record showed no way in which hous-
ing the disabled individuals in question threatened the legitimate 
interests of the state in a way that uses explicitly permitted by the 
ordinance did not. 110 Writing for the majority, Justice White held 
that "requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an 
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded."111 
Thus, the Court affirmed the invalidation of the ordinance, but 
only insofar as it applied to the particular disabled individuals in 
this single case. 112 The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's 
contention that the ordinance's classification scheme was quasi-
suspect.113 Instead, the Court proposed that, in contrast to race or 
gender classifications, neither the disability classification's appear-
ance in the city's zoning ordinance or its general use in statutes 
was suspect. 114 Accordingly, the Court determined that there 
should be no general presumption that legislative action employ-
ing the classification makes unconstitutional distinctions regarding 
treatment, even if such legislation systematically disadvantages in-
dividuals who fall within the classification. 115 
Although the Court explicitly limited its diagnosis that prejudice 
against people with mental retardation lies behind the special 
104. ld. at 201-02. 
105. I d. at 203 (affirming the trial court's holding that the Johnson County Association 
of Retarded Citizens lacked standing). 
106. ld. at 200. 
107. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 469 U.S. 1016 (1984). 
108. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985 ). 
109. I d. at 435. 
llO. Jd. at 448. 
Ill. I d. at 450. 
ll2. ld. 
ll3. /d. at 439-42. 
ll4. Jd. at 442-43. 
ll5. Jd. 
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permit requirement to "this case," the zoning requirement could 
hardly have some other motivation if it continued to be applied to 
raise the same high barrier against the presence of other group 
homes for other unrelated mentally retarded people in the 
Cleburne neighborhood. There are several reasons for looking 
closely at this element of the Cleburne decision. 
First, we cannot ignore the role played by what clearly appears 
to be a heightened level of scrutiny in the final disposition of 
Cleburne. Had the appellate court not been free to scrutinize the 
presumption that differential treatment of mentally retarded peo-
ple served a rational interest of the state, the city would not have 
had the burden of delineating what interests the high barrier of 
the special permit requirement furthered. If scrutiny had not been 
applied, the fact that the connection purported to hold between 
the ordinance's provisions and its purpose was illogical would not 
have become evident. By denying that statutory classifications dis-
advantaging mentally retarded people should prompt scrutiny, the 
Court made it much more difficult to test the equitability, as well as 
the validity, of claims that associate their exclusion from civic and 
commercial opportunity with benefits to the public interest. 
Second, the Court's emphasis on the particularity of its decision 
seems odd in view of its analysis of the motivation behind the 
zoning ordinance restrictions. Its criticisms of the city's defense 
turned on the injustice of the zoning prohibition's form, not on 
the injustice of this particular application. Demonstrating the 
latter involved showing that the particular individuals expected to 
occupy this particular home did not deserve to fall under the ban. 
But the characteristics of those individuals-whether each needed 
protection or might be disruptive-were never taken to be 
relevant. 
Instead, the Court rejected the ordinance's classification be-
cause it appeared seriously overinclusive in relation to its 
purported purposes. If the ordinance was meant to classify people 
in pursuit of the state's interest in protecting the weak and incom-
petent, it irrationally permitted many vulnerable types of people to 
be exposed to the dangers of the neighborhood. If the ordinance 
was meant to classify peopie in pursuit of the state's interest in pro-
tecting the tranquility of the neighborhood, it irrationally and 
explicitly excluded from the prohibition types of people more dis-
ruptive than the disabled classification it banned. 
Under some circumstances, underinclusion does not constitute 
inequitable treatment. Underinclusiveness may be justified when it 
100 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 35:1&2 
is administratively impracticable to bring all relevant groups simi-
larly under a statute, 116 but no such defense explained why the city 
did not bring boarding houses, fraternity houses, and convalescent 
homes, among other group uses explicitly permitted by the ordi-
nance, under the special permit requirement. Underinclusiveness 
may also be justified when it is politically impracticable to bring all 
relevant groups similarly under a statute.117 However, as Tussman 
and tenBroek remarked in 1949, the demand for equal laws is 
meaningless if politically strong groups are permitted to win favor 
in legislation. 118 This observation remains extremely pertinent to 
the status of individuals with disabilities (as well as to other catego-
• ) 119 nes. 
As the underinclusiveness of the ordinance's classification ap-
peared to taint it inescapably, the Court's reluctance to 
acknowledge the injustice of future applications to prevent the es-
tablishment of homes for groups of mentally retarded citizens is 
disturbing. Nothing in the Court's own analysis suggested that fu-
ture applications of the flawed law would not be propelled by the 
same irrational prejudice the Court found to be aimed at the 
Cleburne Living Center. Nor does the analysis indicate how, in fu-
ture attempts to establish group homes for mentally retarded 
people, the city could rectify the glaring absence of legitimate state 
interests in requiring special use permits. 
Third, what is especially illogical about the Court's reluctance to 
generalize is the impact of its approach on future litigation. Un-
derstandably, by determining that the special use permit 
requirement deprived particular respondents of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, the Court could evade deciding whether the 
special use provision was facially invalid in respect to the mentally 
retarded and avoid making broad constitutional judgments. The 
oddity is that the Court equated invalidating the existing ordi-
nance with declaring that the city "may never insist on a special use 
permit for a home for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone." 120 But 
to think that invalidating the ordinance had this implication was 
116. See joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. 
REv. 341,349 (1949). 
117. !d. at 350-51. 
118. They explained that "legislative submission to political pressure does not consti-
tute a fair reason for failure to extend the operation of a law to those similarly situated 
whom it leaves untouched." !d. at 350. 
119. See Adam Milani, Living in the World: A New Look at the Disabled in the Law of Torts, 48 
CATH. U. L. REv. 323 (2000); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Law Review Article Revisited, 71 
CHI. KENT L. REv. 751 (1996) (ranking the Tussman & tenBroek article as the fourteenth 
most cited law review article of all time). 
120. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,447 (1984). 
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fallacious, for there were several ways in which a carefully tailored 
ordinance could avoid the inconsistencies, and thereby the inequi-
ties, to which the Court objected. 
By the time of Cleburne, it was commonplace for the Court to ex-
act careful tailoring. 121 However, prescribing careful tailoring 
requires believing either that the presence of mentally retarded 
people typically is no more burdensome on a neighborhood than 
that of convalescents, transients, or fraternity boys, so that high 
barriers are raised only against the sub-set of the classification who 
cannot be assimilated in these respects, or mentally retarded peo-
ple are typically so much more burdensome that high barriers are 
needed to address burdensome traits demonstrably characteristic 
of most members of the classified group. 
However, the majority seemed unwilling to commit to the first 
belief, refraining from declaring unequivocally that mentally re-
tarded neighbors are generally not burdensome. On the other 
hand, the majority opinion is devoid of any systematic empirical 
demonstration of the truth of the alternative view, namely, that 
mentally retarded neighbors are typically more burdensome than 
the other categories of neighbor. Instead, the Court fell back on 
language in the Developmental Disabilities Ad 22 and the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act (now called the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act), 123 to the effect that mentally retarded 
people have a right to receive the educational, medical, and custo-
dial benefits bestowed by these laws in the least restrictive setting 
appropriate to their individual abilities. 124 
The Court said that this language implicidy assumes the need 
for some restrictions. 125 But such an inference is misleading, if not 
deceptive. The statutory language cited is equally compatible with 
either the need for restrictions being typical of, or instead being 
relatively uncommon for, the classification. 126 That is, the way the 
statutory language is phrased assumes that there are some mem-
bers of the classification who benefit from restrictive settings, but 
nothing in the language indicates whether such individuals are 
common or rare. 
Thus, the keystone of the Court's reluctance to streamline con-
stitutional protection for the mentally retarded, and by 
121. See generaUy LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1988). 
122. 42 u.s.c. § 6010 (1977). 
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1975). 
124. Ckburne, 473 U.S. at444-45. 
125. !d. 
126. !d. at 445. 
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extrapolation for all disabled people, is the prevailing characteriza-
tion of the properties that constitute the group's identity. As the 
Goesart Court characterized women collectively in terms of socially 
undesirable dependence and disturbance, so the Cleburne Court 
characterized mentally retarded people in the same terms. And as 
in Goesart, the Court evoked stereotypes and appealed to question-
able inferences, rather than requiring demonstrable evidence that 
the classification's members are factually characterized as inher-
ently disruptive and terribly vulnerable. 
Parenthetically, to be as explicit as the Cleburne Court about par-
ticularizing a decision to a single case condemns every one situated 
similarly to the plaintiffs to litigating anew. In his partial dissent, 
Justice Marshall identified this problem as "the novel proposition 
that 'the preferred course of adjudication' is to leave standing a 
legislative Act resting on 'irrational prejudice,' thereby forcing in-
dividuals in the group discriminated against to continue to run the 
Act's gauntlet. "127 This problem has become endemic to disability 
discrimination law, where the same issues about access have to be 
litigated vendor by vendor, program provider by program provider, 
facility by facility, individually for each supplier of the same benefit 
or service, and may have to be revisited whenever the management 
of a facility or program changes hands. Ironically, the volume of 
litigation invited by the Court's reluctance to generalize disability 
discrimination findings is sometimes cited as evidence of the bur-
densomeness of the policy of providing equal opportunity for the 
disabled. 128 As we have seen, however, the problem of burgeoning 
litigation does not derive from the nature of disability nor from 
any special difficulties in knowing when people with disabilities 
have been harmed by discrimination. The problem is attributable 
to the way courts have approached the classification. 
Close examination of the Cleburne Court's reasoning elucidates 
the problem. The Cleburne Court held that no heightened level of 
judicial review is demanded just because mentally retarded people 
are picked out for special statutory treatment. 129 That is because, 
the Court ruled, mentally retarded people are different from other 
people, and therefore states have wide latitude to treat them dif-
ferently.130 The presumption that differential treatment of mentally 
retarded people is warranted extends to treatment that harms 
them. On this reading of equal protection, a statute or policy that 
127. /d. at 473-74 (Marshali,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (intemal ci-
tations omitted). 
128. See id. 
129. /d. at 442-43. 
130. Id. at 445. 
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picks out the population of mentally retarded people for disadvan-
tageous treatment raises no constitutional warning flag. To free 
themselves of the restrictions of any such burdensome statute or 
policy, individuals with mental retardation have to pursue litigation 
to show that they, personally, do not merit being handicapped by 
it. 
In refusing to affirm the lower court's judgment that the Cle-
burne ordinance compromised equal protection for a classification 
of people, the Court raised and resolved five issues about the clas-
sification. These may be recast as questions for which there will be 
affirmative answers if the equal protection standard is met in re-
gard to a group that is being treated differently. This means that 
disadvantaging a group of citizens is presumptively justified and is 
not a violation of equal protection if the answer to the following 
questions about the group is "yes." 
1. Is there a real difference between the group's 
members and other people?131 
2. Does the difference affect people's ability to cope 
with and function in the every day world?132 
3. In this regard, is the difference's impact immuta-
ble?t33 
4. Is the difference rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest?134 
5. On balance, has the difference elicited more bene-
ficial than burdensome statutory treatment? 135 
Thus, the Cleburne decision suggests a five-part test for statutory 
provisions which impose more disadvantages on some groups of 
citizens than on others. In respect both to cognitive impairment 
and to disability generally, the. majority decision declared, the 
answers are affirmative.136 Thus, in general, differential statutory 
treatment directed at disability is permissible.137 Sometimes, 
however, there are instances in which the answer to the fourth 
question is "no." For example, no legitimate state interest was 
served by prohibiting the particular individuals with mental 
retardation who were slated to live in Cleburne from doing so. 
131. /d. at442. 
132. /d. at443. 
133. /d. at442. 
134. /d. 
135. /d. at444. 
136. /d. at442. 
137. /d. at443. 
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Thus, a statute may pass the test but an application of it fail the 
test and therefore be properly subject to judicial correction. 138 
Consequently, the nature of the disability category effectively de-
crees that each allegation of disability discrimination must be 
litigated independently rather than yielding to precedent. Case law 
therefore cannot effectively stimulate broader social policy reform. 
The Court acknowledged that people who fall within the cate-
gory of mental retardation differ from each other as much or 
more than some of them differ from non-retarded people. 139 Nev-
ertheless, the opinion affirmed the constitutionality of mental 
retardation as a statutory classification. 140 The classification is nec-
essary, the Court said, for the government to pursue policies 
designed to assist retarded people in realizing their full poten-
tial.141 Thus, there can be no presumption that legislative action 
regarding retarded people is "rooted in considerations that the 
Constitution will not tolerate." 142 This is so even if, incidentally, the 
action patently disadvantages some retarded individuals. 143 
To put it in contemporary terms, the state may engage in broad 
disability profiling if there is some public purpose for separating 
out some disabled people for separate treatment. 144 Moreover, be-
cause the facts about mental retardation and disability in general 
are so complex, the Court thought legislatures were best suited to 
determine how people so classified should be treated. By implica-
tion, this deference would extend to determinations of the degree 
to which all members of the class may be burdened for purposes 
I . I 145 re atmg on y to some. 
The Cleburne doctrine (which might also be called the Goesart 
doctrine because of its similar reasoning) calls out for critical 
analysis. Martha Minow offers an instructive commentary by articu-
lating several different accounts of the values at issue in Justice 
White's majority opinion and the separate opinions ofjustices Ste-
vens146 and Marshall. 147 While we admire the sweep of her 
approach, we think it may overlook or obscure a central disagree-
138. /d. at446. 
139. /d. at442. 
140. See id. at 442-46. 
141. /d. at445. 
142. /d. at446. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. However, in Garrett the Court appears to have changed its position on the 
deference due to the legislative process. See Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) 
(Breyer,]., dissenting). 
145. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443. 
146. /d. at 451 (concurring, joined by the Chief justice). 
147. /d. at 455 (concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan, J., and 
Blackmun,J.). 
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ment over the logic of validly constructing constitutionally pro-
tected classes. 
According to Min ow, three different views of the matter of classi-
fication emerge from the Cleburne discussion. 148 Writing for the 
Court, Justice White took mentally retarded people to be a class of 
naturally inferior people, who "have a reduced ability to cope with 
and function in the everyday world." 149 As a group, he concluded, 
they are "different, immutably so, in relevant respects."150 This dif-
ference is supposed to establish that a state's interest in providing 
for the retarded is legitimate. 151 That there is legislation "singling 
out the retarded for special treatment reflects the real and unde-
niable differences between the retarded and others .... 
[G]overnmental consideration of those differences in the vast ma-
jority of situations is not only legitimate but also desirable."152 In 
sum, the Court validated the classification because of its usefulness 
in "a wide range of decisions."153 
To Minow, this means assuming that society is divided into two 
classes, normal and abnormal people, and that mentally retarded 
people are more like each other than like the rest of the commu-
nity.154 In the majority's view, people with mental retardation are 
different, and their difference warrants differential treatment 
whether or not they are disadvantaged by it. 155 On the other hand, 
Justice Stevens emphasized the similarity of mentally retarded 
people to the rest of the community. In his view, their similarity 
warranted equal treatment unless "[a]n impartial lawmaker-
indeed, even a member of a class of persons defined as mentally 
retarded-could rationally vote in favor of a law" that provides for 
differential treatment. 156 Far from being presumed to be justified, 
statutory provisions that limit the opportunities of mentally re-
tarded people must be perceived as rationally related not only to 
an impartial state interest but also to the interests of those who 
through its action will be deprived. For instance, Justice Stevens 
148. See Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the MentaUy Re-
tarded, Equal Protection and the Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 111, 
120-31 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, When Difference Has Its Home]. See also MARTHA MINOW, 
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 106 (1990) 
[hereinafter MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE]. 
149. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at442. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 444. 
153. I d. at 446. 
154. See MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 106. 
155. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. 
156. Id. at 454 (Stevens,]., concurring). 
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thought that both an impartial legislator and a self-interested re-
tarded person could support preventing retarded people from 
. h d . 157 operaung azar ous eqmpment. 
Minow objected that this way of thinking abstracts from and 
thereby disregards retarded people's real differences by assimilat-
ing them to the "rational man" standard that forms a community 
norm.
158 It is a mistake, however, to equate mental retardation with 
irrationality. As even Justice White agreed, the classification ranges 
over "those whose disability is not immediately evident to those 
who must be constantly cared for. "159 Further, the record estab-
lished that nearly ninety percent of the individuals falling into the 
classification are only mildly retarded, and another six percent are 
moderately retarded. 160 
Being rational requires no great intelligence, especially when 
one is being rational about what is in one's self-interest. When 
Sandra jensen, a woman with Down Syndrome, fought for a place 
on a heart transplant list, she not only understood that securing a 
new heart was in her rational self-interest but argued compellingly 
that she deserved this opportunity. 161 She argued with reference to 
the similarity of her situation to that of the nonretarded patients 
admitted without controversy to the list. 162 She used, in other 
words, a definitively rational form of argument.163 When, as they 
often do, people with mild mental retardation object to being 
treated less favorably than nondisabled people, they are appealing 
to consistency and thereby demonstrating their grasp of a basic 
tenet of rationality. 
Let us assume that retarded people as a class are different in 
some way from nonretarded people, for there is no controversy 
that the classification has some reference. Nevertheless, there is 
great controversy over the boundaries of the classification, as well 
as where, within the classification, individuals best fit. In Cleburne, 
the Court initially spoke as if the boundary is "a reduced ability to 
157. /d. 
158. Review MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 115, 341-49, 
bearing in mind her treatment of In re PhiUip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. App. 3d. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980), in which a trial judge used a similar device to introduce the 
"standpoint" of a mentally retarded fourteen year old. 
159. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
160. /d. at 442 n.9. 
161. See Celeste Fremon, "We Do Not Feel that Patients with Dawn Syndrome are Appropriate 
Candidates for Heart-Lung Transplantation": These Words were a Death Sentence for Sandra Jensen, 
and That, She Decided, just Wasn't Going to Happen, L.A. TIMES, April14, 1996, at 18. 
162. See id. 
163. Jensen succeeded, becoming "the first seriously retarded person in the United 
States to receive a major transplant." New Heart for Retarded Woman, N.Y. TIMEs, January 24, 
1996, at A16. 
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cope with and function in the everyday world."164 But this charac-
terization is as apdy applied to absent-minded professors, 
improvident artists, and unworldly religieuses as to mentally re-
tarded people. All the latter can behave so incompetently and 
disruptively as to be burdensome, but all enjoy the scope of the 
equal protection standard that is denied to mentally retarded peo-
ple. 
Another formulation is "limitations on general ability to meet 
the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, 
and social responsibility expected for an individual's age level and 
cultural group."165 Surely this characterization is much too vague. It 
is the further idea that such limitations are immutable that seemed 
to sway the Court. But this is also an unclear attribution, for new 
educational techniques defeat claims about the immutability of 
some retarded people's limitations. A nineteen-year-old with Down 
Syndrome who is a high school graduate, enrolled in a community 
college, and earning a wage surely falls within societal standards. 
In her case, immutability pertains to the biological condition of 
her trisomy, not to her social limitations. Clearly, it is to her alter-
able social limitations, not to her immutable chromosomal trisomy, 
that any rational state interests pertain. 
The Court also proposed that "the distinctive legislative re-
sponse, both national and state, to the plight of those who are 
mentally retarded demonstrates that they have unique problems . 
• • • "
166 This reasoning is, of course, circular, and it does not demon-
strate that these problems arise from immutable deficits. In 
asserting that "legislation ... singling out the retarded for special 
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the 
retarded and others,"167 the Court neglected to note the extent to 
which these differences are reified when legislatures or other so-
cial spokespersons single them out for special comment or 
treatment. Thus, even currently real social differences between 
retarded and nonretarded people may be mutable, depending on 
how cultural practice and habit address them. In this regard, Jus-
tice Marshall referred in his partial dissent to the history in which 
mentally retarded people were left to their own devices and were 
expected to be basically self-sufficient, until the later nineteenth 
164. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
165. !d. at 442 n.9 (citing the brief submitted by the American Association on Mental 
Deficiency in order to define "deficits in adaptive behavior.") (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
166. !d. at 443. 
167. !d. at 444. 
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century, when "[a] regime of state-mandated segregation and deg-
radation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, 
and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow" and 
"[m]assive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the re-
tarded for life."168 The results of this history continue to influence 
the extent to which mentally retarded people develop self-
sufficiency today. 
Marshall emphasized that a population's history contributes to 
the differences that currently are characteristics of the group. On 
Minow's interpretation, Marshall's account verges on a "social-
relations" approach in which differences between groups are ac-
knowledged and respected. 169 The meaning of such differences is 
always contextualized. Their import must be assessed with regard 
to power differentials and other relationships that exist between 
the groups. 170 Attributions of difference that fuel exclusionary 
practices are condemned as self-serving mechanisms for preserving 
the power of dominant classes. There is, instead, an emphasis on 
interconnectedness and on the multiplicity of avenues for contrib-
uting to the collective good.171 The social-relations approach calls 
for reform of marginalizing practices so as to cultivate the freedom 
of diverse kinds of people to participate in both the rewards and 
the responsibilities of social interaction. 172 
In sum, the m~ority of the Court presumed that retarded peo-
ple's differences, and by extrapolation the differences from 
species-typical biology displayed by other persons with disabilities, 
were legitimate ·proxies for sociallimitations. 173 Unless proven oth-
168. !d. at 462 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
169. MIN OW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 119. 
170. !d. at 211-24. 
171. !d. 
172. !d. at 224. 
173. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356 (2001) makes explicit the 
Court's intention to extrapolate across disabilities when invoking the Cleburne doctrine. In 
Garrett, the Court invoked the Cleburne doctrine to strip away much of the protection against 
disability discrimination the ADA had granted to state employees. Garrett, 535 U.S. at 365--
66. Following Cleburne, the Court shifted the burden to disabled plaintiffs to establish that 
no state interest in excluding the disabled from the workplace was conceivable. !d. Further, 
the Court's description of disabled people as needing "allowances" and "special 
accommodations," terms that do not appear in the text of the ADA, is indicative of a 
presumption that disabled people are less competent than nondisabled people. See id. at 
964. By characterizing disabled people as being in need of special treatment, the Court 
stipulated that refusing to include them in the workplace was prima facie rational, rather 
than considering this to be an open question awaiting empirical determination. Further, the 
Court's stipulation that "hiring employees able to use existing facilities," rather than 
qualified disabled employees who cannot, id. at 966. is rational underlines the great 
disparity between the treatment of disabled people and women. It is inconceivable that an 
employer's overt refusal to hire qualified women simply because the existing facilities have 
urinals would be upheld as nondiscriminatory. 
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erwise on a case by case basis, these differences are rationally re-
lated to interests of the state. Stevens' concurrence presumed 
exactly the opposite, that disabled people's differences are not 
relevant, unless proven otherwise. Marshall's partial dissent took 
the history of oppression of disabled people to be a lens that in-
exorably distorted assessments of their differences. 
As illuminating as Marshall's analysis is, it addressed the 
assessment rather than the construction of the relevant class. The 
analysis assumed that the disabled are different but did not ask 
which of their differences are relevantly and responsibly 
referenced as traits definitive of the class. People can differ from 
one another biologically or socially. We already have seen that 
biological properties, such as a certain level of intelligence or the 
absence or impairment of a corporeal component, are essential to 
the disability classification but are not socially relevant unless they 
are linked to limitations that render individuals burdensomely 
dependent or disruptive. Essential biological properties may be 
shared by all who are subject to the classification, but not all the 
classification's members may be socially burdensome or disruptive. 
Only a minority may be so. 
A similar clarification applies to the sex classification at issue in 
Goesart. To be sure, certain biological properties are essential to 
the female sex classification, but any link these might have to de-
pendency and disruptiveness is a mere contingency. The Goesart 
Court stipulated that dependency and disruptiveness are inexora-
bly linked to being female by invoking an essentialist definition, 
but there is no better witness to the tenuousness of the link the 
Goesart Court took to be unquestionable than the Cleburne Court, 
which insisted that statutes distributing benefits and burdens be-
tween the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded 
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women. 174 
It took no more than three decades for beliefs that were patent 
to the Goesart Court to seem outmoded to the Cleburne Court. 
There are two matters on which these Courts do agree: that there 
is a difference between women and men, and that for a sub-set of 
women, this difference is associated with dependent or disturbing 
behavior. Yet for the Goesart Court, the sub-set that is saliently de-
pendent or disturbing is representative of the classification, while 
for the Cleburne Court thinking of this same sub-set of women as 
representative of the female classification is retrogressive thinking. 
174. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
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At the heart of the Cleburne decision lie questions of fact and 
justice about the latitude with which the states' interests in con-
straining or excluding a sub-set of a classification may be served 
by activities that impose special burdens on, and reduce oppor-
tunity for, the entire membership of the class. The classification 
employed by the Cleburne ordinance was underinclusive because 
it did not burden many groups touched by its rationale, and it 
was also overinclusive because some, and perhaps the majority, of 
individuals subjected to its burden are not touched by its ration-
ale. Let us now assume not only that retarded people are 
different from nonretarded people in some respects, but that a 
sub-set of the classification differs precisely in the respect of being 
strongly linked by empirical evidence to dependency and distur-
bance. Even so, as Tussman and tenBroek pointed out, 
overinclusiveness is a more egregious violation of the standards of 
reasonable classification than underinclusiveness because "over-
inclusive classifications reach out to the innocent bystander, the 
hapless victim of circumstance or association."175 To the Cleburne 
Court both the underinclusiveness and the overinclusiveness of the 
sex classification embraced by the Goesart Court reflected "out-
moded notions" that violated standards of reasonable 
classification. 176 To the Cleburne Court, the under-inclusiveness of 
the disability classification violated reasonable classification stan-
dards, but its overinclusiveness did not. 177 
What we have seen so far is that the Cleburne Court's confidence 
in affirmatively answering the second, third and fourth questions 
of its doctrinal test is warranted only if an overinclusive classifica-
tion is drawn. This point should make us wary of embracing the 
Cleburne doctrine without careful examination of its inherent logic, 
for the point suggests that the doctrine does not promote constitu-
tionally neutral classification. Further, giving an affirmative answer 
to question five, regarding the balance of beneficial over-
burdensome statutory treatment, is also problematic. An affirma-
tive answer may be true only of a minority of the membership of a 
classification, the relatively small number who are the beneficiaries 
of rehabilitative or other special services. To better understand the 
persistence of overinclusiveness in constructing the disability classi-
fication, we now turn to a description of Congress's inartful 
attempt to rebut the Cleburne doctrine, and the results that fol-
lowed. 
175. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 116, at 351. 
176. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. 
177. /d. at 442-46. 
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III. CoNGREss's REsPONSE TO THE CLEBuRNE DocTRINE 
ANDITSAFrERMATH 
A. The Americans With Disabilities Act 
111 
Congress passed the ADA primarily because it saw the systemati-
cally inferior treatment of disabled people as rising to the level of 
unconstitutional discrimination. To ameliorate this problem, it at-
tempted to rebut the Supreme Court's Cleburne doctrine, which 
denied the disabled constitutional scrutiny, by creating a height-
ened level of statutory scrutiny. Nevertheless, Congress was inartful 
in drafting the ADA. The problem lies in the wholesale incorpora-
tion of the definition of disability from the Rehabilitation Act. 
Although the definition itself, which focused on "substantial limita-
tions of major life activities," was facially neutral regarding the 
capability of the protected class to perform social functions, it car-
ried with it culturally retrogressive notions about the disabled. 
Thus, despite including language regarding its clear intention to 
rebut the Cleburne framework in its findings, Congress did not suc-
ceed in blocking this retrogressive conceptualization of disability. 
In fact, the Cleburne doctrine continues to control post-ADA Su-
preme Court decisions. Nevertheless, in drafting the ADA, 
Congress explicitly challenged at least three claims made by the 
Cleburne Court. 
First, the Cleburne Court saw legislative efforts to apply the dis-
ability category as being mainly for positive purposes. 178 Because 
people classified as mentally retarded enjoyed the purported bene-
fits of this classification, the Cleburne Court declared that these 
individuals must be politically powerful.179 By implication, then, 
people classified as eligible for various kinds of disability programs 
are to be considered politically powerful180 as long as legislation 
purported to be beneficial is specially targeted at them. 181 
178. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1984). 
179. Id. at 445. 
180. But see Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Wel-
fare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361 ( 1996). 
181. This implication is strongly rebutted by the work of two philosophers writing on 
the "politics of resentment." See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY (1994); WILLIAM CON· 
NOLLY, IDENTITY /DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX (1991). 
Within the context of the ADA, the subject of backlash was addressed in a symposium pub-
lished by the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, wherein the introduction offers a 
superlative overview. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword: Backlash Against the ADA: Interdis-
ciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
1 (2000). 
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In contrast, Congress addressed this matter empirically.182 The 
findings of an independent nationwide poll of Americans with dis-
abilities conducted in 1986 by Louis Harris and Associates showed 
the disempowerment of the disabled. 183 The lCD Survey found that 
two-thirds of working age individuals with disabilities are unem-
ployed, 184 while two-thirds of non-working disabled individuals want 
to work. 185 
Having amassed evidence that controverted the Cleburne Court's 
presumption, Congress declared in its findings that historically the 
disability category has been invoked for the purpose of denying 
liberties and opportunity to people assigned to it. 186 Testimony 
gathered during its hearings also led Congress to find, explicitly, 
that people with disabilities have been "relegated to a position of 
political powerlessness in our society."187 This last phrase, as well as 
those surrounding it in Congress's legislative finding, were specifi-
182. For a thorough overview by one of the ADA's drafters, see Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., 
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights 
Statute 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991). A very good journalistic account of the poli-
tics behind the passage of the ADA is josEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES FoRGING A NEw CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993). See also Stein, From Crippkd to 
Disabled, supra note 74. 
183. LOUIS HARRIS & AsSOCIATES, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE DISABLED 
SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 
(1986) [hereinafter lCD SuRVEY]. The results of this poll were often cited by organizations 
concerned with the status of individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., NATIONAL CouNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY OF THE 1986 HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES (1988); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD 
OF INDEPENDENCE (1988). In addition, the results of the survey were summarized to Con-
gress by the President of Louis Harris and Associates during hearings on the ADA See 
Guaranteed Job Dppurtunity Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 777 Before the Subcomm. On Employment 
and Productivity and Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. On Labor and Human Resources, 
101st Cong. S. Hrg. 166, pt. 2, at 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor) (quoted inS. REP. 
No. 101-116, at 8 (1989); also quoted in H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 31 (1990)). See also H.R. 
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990). 
184. See lCD SuRVEY, supra note 183, at 47. 
185. /d. at 50-51. 
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (5)(1994) (stating that "individuals with disabilities continu-
ally encounter various forms of discrimination," including those arising from 
"overprotective rules and policies."). See generaUy RICHARD K ScoTCH, FROM Goon WILL TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001); Drimmer, supra 
note 12. 
187. 42 U.S.C. at§ 12101 (a)(7). Congress's difference with the Cleburne Court may be a 
matter of having different reference classes rather than outright denial. The Cleburne Court 
looked to the evidence of public programs lobbied for primarily by interest groups of fami-
lies of people with certain kinds of impairments and the professionals who work with them. 
Such groups, which sometimes but not always are guided by disabled people themselves, 
continue to be active. The very broad-based organization of disabled people to pursue civil 
rights protection, however, was a unique occurrence. This action cannot itself be evidence 
of the political power of disabled people. It would be circular to argue so, for then any ef-
fective political effort to protect a group's civil rights could be undermined on the ground 
that its imminent success demonstrates its disproportionateness. 
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cally taken from Supreme Court decisions approving equal protec-
tion classifications. 188 The use of this specific language in the ADA, 
responding to what the Supreme Court, circa 1990, required for 
heightened constitutional scrutiny, demonstrates that Congress was 
consciously attempting to rebut the Cleburne framework. 
Moreover, Congress cited the "continuing existence of unfair 
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice" denying disabled 
people equal opportunities in society, 189 noting that this disparate 
treatment persisted in areas which states sponsor or control, in-
cluding education, transportation, access to public services, and 
voting. 190 Again, the fact that Congress specifically cited the exis-
tence of this type of social exclusion evidences its intention to 
empower disabled people through the ADA by bestowing upon 
them a heightened level of statutory scrutiny. To counteract this 
phenomenon, Congress explicitly defined "public entity" in Title II 
of the ADA to mean "any State or local government," including all 
their departments and agencies. 191 
The continuation through to the present of state-legislated poli-
cies was recently documented by Justice Breyer's eloquent dissent 
in Garrett. 192 Reviewing the record of legislative hearings and the 
findings presented therein, Justice Breyer concluded that "Con-
gress compiled a vast legislative record" which documented 
extensive and "powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment" of 
the disabled that "implicate[d] state governments." 193 To support 
this argument, Justice Breyer appended to his opinion an extensive 
catalogue of state-sponsored enactments which violated the rights 
of the disabled. 194 Also notable is that in spite of Congress's having 
specifically directed that people with disabilities not be prevented 
from exercising their franchises, as many as one-third of the coun-
try's 120,000 polling places nationwide still lack full access. 195 
Second, the ADA's statement of purpose proclaims a categorical 
antidiscrimination directive by the federal government on behalf 
of disabled Americans. Specifically, Congress declared that the 
statute's main purpose was "to provide a clear and comprehensive 
188. See Burgdorf, supra note 182, at 436. _ 
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9). 
190. !d.§ 12101 (a)(3). 
191. !d.§ 12131(1)(A)-(B). 
192. SeeUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356,376 (2001) (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
193. !d. at 969-70. 
194. !d. at 977-93. 
195. As a result, in 1996 only thirty percent of voting-age disabled people cast ballots, 
compared to forty-nine percent of the nondisabled voting population. See David Cracy, Dis-
abled Voters Roused to Action, AP NAT'L WIRE, Nov. 2, 2000. 
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national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities,"196 by promulgating "clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards addressing" both individual and 
systematic forms of discrimination. 197 Congress also stated that part 
of its purpose in promulgating the legislation was "to ensure that 
the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the stan-
dards" established by the ADA. 198 This language indicates that 
policies and practices are to be enjoined if they are found to invite 
or facilitate discriminatory actions. Cleburne excepted any state 
policies or practices that could be rationally related to a state in-
terest and required that relief be sought application by 
application, 199 and therefore with very little potential for stimulat-
ing social transformation. In a contrasting response, Congress, 
through passage of the ADA, said it would bring about sweeping 
changes in social policy.200 Hence, Congress's overt intention in 
promulgating the statute was to raise the level at which social ex-
clusions of the disabled would be examined by courts in the 
future. 
Third, the Cleburne test presumes that disability immutably di-
minishes people's capacity to cope with and function in the 
world.201 On the other hand, the ADA is premised on the belief 
that the repercussions of disability often are mutable.202 In many 
instances, they are mitigated or thoroughly relieved when the so-
cial environment accommodates physical and cognitive 
difference. 203 Here again, legislative history shows that Congress 
was presented with a prodigious body of evidence-case after case 
in which being disabled resulted in capable citizens being denied 
opportunity and excluded from social participation.204 
The more compelling anecdotal evidence205 included testimony: 
by a wheelchair-using future under-secretary of the Department of 
Education who was removed from an auction house for being 
196. 42 u.s.c. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). 
197. /d.§ 12101(b)(2). 
198. /d.§ 12101(b)(3). 
199. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 474 (1985) (Marshall, 
]., concurring). 
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
201. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
202. See generaUy SILVERS, supra note 18. 
203. Ironically, the Supreme Court's holdings in Sutton, Murphy, and Alhertson can be in-
terpreted to mean that for ADA purposes, the use of mitigating measures by disabled 
people transmogrifies them into "normal," non-disabled people bereft of antidiscrimination 
protection. See generaUy Soifer, supra note 48. 
204. See generaUy Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integra-
tion, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393 (1991). 
205. Compiled inS. REP. No. 101-116 (1989). 
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deemed "disgusting to look at;"206 about individuals with Down 
Syndrome who were banned from a zoo because of the keeper's 
fear they would frighten the chimpanzees;207 that an academically 
competitive and nondisruptive child was barred from attending 
public school because of a teacher's allegation that his physical ap-
pearance "produced a nauseating effect" upon classmates;208 and of 
the denial of a job to a competent arthritic woman by a college 
because of its trustees' belief that "normal students shouldn't see 
her. "209 As a result of its extensive hearings, Congress found, as an 
empirical matter, that disabled individuals have been subject to 
many forms of discrimination, "including outright intentional ex-
clusion"210 as well as more invidious forms of exclusion arising 
through policies, practices, and "exclusionary qualification stan-
dards and criteria."211 
In sum, the fact that Congress compiled extensive evidence of 
discrimination, endorsed remedies to ameliorate this condition in 
the form of an antidiscrimination law, and specifically utilized lan-
guage in its Findings which reflects 1990 constitutional theory, all 
evidence its intention that courts utilize a raised level of scrutiny 
when examining the exclusion of the disabled. 
B. The judicial Response to the ADA 
Despite the vast evidence compiled by Congress in support of 
the ADA's passage, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it 
questionable whether any factual demonstrations of the compe-
tence of people with disabilities could ever incline this Court to 
accept the beliefs that frame the ADA.212 
206. ld. at 6-7 (testimony of Judith Heumann). 
207. ld. at 7. 
208. ld. 
209. ld. at 7-8. 
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994). 
211. ld. 
212. See Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356, 360-61 (2001). Moreover, the issue of 
legislative history and intent being rendered impotent goes beyond the field of disability 
law. In an insightful article entitled "Dissing Congress," Professors Colker and Brudney 
argue that during the 1990s (a period coinciding with the post-ADA cases) the Court devel-
oped a dual methodology for assessing the constitutional adequacy of federal 
antidiscrimination laws that is almost impossible for Congressional enactments to withstand. 
See Colker & Brudney, Dissing Congress, supra note 27, at 85 (2001 ). They demonstrate, in the 
context of age discrimination, how the Court has developed a "phantom legislative history 
approach." !d. Under this framework, "the Court expresses interest in considering legisla-
tive history when assessing constitutionality, but then establishes and applies a legal standard 
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Here we may recall that while acknowledging the "vast changes 
in the social and legal position of women,"213 the Goesart Court 
held that "the fact that women may now have achieved the virtues 
that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge 
in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the states 
from drawing a sharp line between the sexes."214 The Cleburne 
Court permitted benefits and burdens to be distributed differently 
to disabled and nondisabled persons because of the presumed dif-
ference in their capabilities. 215 In the spirit of Goesart, the current 
Court may continue to draw sharp lines between species-typical 
and biologically anomalous people regardless of technological, 
social, and legal changes that permit disabled people to achieve 
the capabilities long practiced by the nondisabled. 216 Much effort 
by the current Court has gone into pressing the disability category 
into conformity with the framework on which Cleburne was built. By 
disregarding Congress's attempt to throw off the Cleburne frame-
work, the Court may have disabled Congress. For it may be 
impossible to legislate remedies for disability discrimination with-
out breaking out of Cleburne's straitjacket of reasoning. 
The construction of the Cleburne Court's reasoning places on the 
conceptualization of disability is guided by the judicial emphasis 
on the centrality of being dysfunctional to being disabled. This is 
the message of five of the six cases the Court has heard since pas-
sage of the ADA. (The sixth, Olmstead, centered on individuals who 
are mentally retarded and in extended medical dependence, and 
who therefore conformed ideally to the Cleburne template.) In 
Bragdon, decided in 1998, perceived limitation of reproductive 
function qualified an individual as disabled.217 As we showed in Part 
I, the source of this limitation lay in social convention rather than 
biological fact. The following year, plaintiff Cleveland was deemed 
to have ADA protection in retaining employment, even though she 
for review that even a detailed legislative record could not possibly satisfY." !d. at 85--86. This 
is precisely the concern voiced by Justice Breyer in his Garrett dissent. See Garrett, 535 U.S. at 
376-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Even when Congress established a detailed and lengthy re-
cord of state-sponsored discrimination against the disabled, the current Court's majority was 
entrenched so deeply in retrogressive methodology that it categorized the historical evi-
dence as failing to prove systematic discrimination by the states. See id. at 960. 
213. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,465-66 (1948). 
214. !d. at 466. 
215. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,444 (1985). 
216. The current Court, as evidenced through the 1999 trio of holdings in Sutton, Mur-
phy, and Albertson s discussed infra in Part III, appears to deal with advances in 
pharmaceutical and prosthetic technology by holding that disabled people who use them 
may fall beyond disability discrimination protection because their impairments are miti-
gated. 
217. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998). 
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had exercised a statutory entitlement to Social Security Disability 
Insurance.218 However, the burden shifted to her to show that with 
reasonable accommodation she could overcome the crucial as-
pects of the employment-related dysfunction on which her SSDI 
application was based.219 Thus, the Court preserved the Cleburne 
principle, where assignment to the disability classification carries a 
presumption of incompetence, and continued to expect individu-
als so classified to prove themselves exceptions to the presumption 
in order to gain access to the normal opportunity range. In the 
same year as Cleveland, plaintiffs Sutton,220 Kirkingburg221 and Mur-
phy222 were all disqualified from protection against disability 
discrimination because in the eyes of the Court, the limitations 
occasioned by their impairments could be overcome.223 
A curious digression may give the influence of Cleburne over 
Sutton away. Although Sutton concerns the classification of myopia 
as a disability, the Court goes out of its way to illustrate its point by 
discussing diabetes.224 Diabetes also should not be viewed 
categorically as a disability, according to the opinion, despite the 
clarity with which the ADA's legislative history shows Congress's 
intent to address disability discrimination against people with 
diabetes.225 Because diabetes may or may not affect an individual's 
performance of major life activities, the Court declared it 
impermissible to treat people with this condition as prima facie 
falling into the disability category.226 Instead, how each citizen with 
diabetes handles her condition must be assessed individually, 
application by application, in order to learn whether that 
particular citizen is protected against disability discrimination.227 
Why digress to disassociate the diagnosis of diabetes from dis-
ability? There are two important ways in which diabetes differs 
from mental retardation, which is the paradigm for the Cleburne 
doctrine. First, mental retardation more commonly diminishes 
people's ability to cope with and function in the every day world 
218. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
219. See id. at 798. 
220. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
221. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
222. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
223. The myth of a disabled person "overcoming" his or her disability, and the catch-22 
that ensues, is discussed in Stein, From Crippled to Disabled, supra note 74. 
224. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. 
225. /d. at 501. 
226. /d. at478. 
227. /d. at 483. 
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than does diabetes. 228 This was not always so, but has become the 
case because contemporary medications directly mitigate some of 
diabetes' effects.229 
Suppose now that Congress' explicit intention to include people 
with diabetes in the disability category were to be honored. In 
other words, for purposes of the ADA, biologically anomalous but 
mainly functional individuals who experience differential treat-
ment by the state primarily in respect to being blocked from 
pursuing opportunities available to biologically species-typical and 
fully functional people, are included in the disability category. If 
the disability category is understood in this way, there is an empiri-
cal question about whether it is populated mostly by individuals 
who are mainly dysfunctional because of their biological anoma-
lies, and who experience differential treatment by the state 
primarily in regard to receiving protective benefits not available to 
species-typical people. 
In the absence of facts establishing that this is so, there is reason 
to agree with the conclusion voiced by the Ninth Circuit in Kirk-
ingburg, namely, that in order to prevent unconstitutional behavior, 
the ADA's provisions may prohibit some state conduct that might 
pass muster under rational basis review.230 This is because what is 
perceived as the rational treatment of any class of diverse individu-
als is affected by which among them is taken to be paradigmatic of 
the class. Thus treatment that might be rational in respect to a 
small sub-set of biologically anomalous people could be unconsti-
tutionally burdensome when applied broadly by virtue of people's 
biological anomalies. 
Minow observed that the play of categorization in law and pub-
lic policy often fails to distinguish speculative from actual 
ramifications of biological variation.231 Anthony Amsterdam and 
Jerome Bruner explain why this is so: legal categories function to 
regulate risk by sorting people into those who have an affinity 
within the system and those who threaten it.232 The more promi-
nently a classification is thought of in terms of members' potential 
228. See generaUy AMERICAN AssOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDA-
TION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (1992). On the intersection 
of mental retardation and the ADA, see PETER DAVID BLANCK, THE AMERICANS WITH DIS-
ABILITIES ACT AND THE EMERGING WORKFORCE: EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
RETARDATION (1998). 
229. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 501 (suggesting that the effects of diabetes can be controlled). 
230. Kirkingburg v. Albertson's Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998). 
231. See MIN OW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 174. 
232. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & jEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw: How COURTS 
RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND THE 
LAW AND OURSELVES 25 (2000). 
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for dependency or disruptiveness, the more important the interest 
of the state in treating the class dissimilarly is presumed to be. 233 
Such differential policies will be understood as strategies for ad-
dressing the moral or social problems attributed to the class. 
Congress defined the disabled as that group of people who have 
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual[s],"234 those who 
have a history of such impairment,235 or are regarded as having 
them.236 This language references limitation of major life activities,· 
which means constriction of one of the principal processes or per-
formances of life.237 The language does not, however, directly 
reference the capabilities of those individuals to execute social 
functions, such as work. IndiViduals limited in respect to a particu-
lar major life activity may execute social functions associated with 
that activity through performances of other major life activities. 
For example, people who are substantially limited in the major life 
activity of seeing can obtain information from texts by touching 
(Brailled text) or hearing (voice output of electronic text). 
The tripartite definition was imported from the Rehabilitation 
Act to the ADA.238 In the context of the Rehabilitation Act, limita-
tion of major life processes or performances may be associated 
prominently with the dependency that providing the special bene-
fit of rehabilitation services is supposed to overcome. Beyond the 
context of the Rehabilitation Act, however, this association is not 
necessarily prominent. In fact, the ADA's legislative findings dem-
onstrate clearly that Congress differentiated between being 
substantially limited in a major life activity (for example, being un-
able to walk) 239 and being competent so far as being capable of 
performing social functions (working, for instance). 240 That Con-
gress so distinguished between the two concepts of function and 
competence in promulgating the ADA, a discernment attributed to 
it by two of the ADA's drafters,241 is demonstrated by the statute's 
233. /d. 
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). 
235. /d.§ 12102(2)(8). 
236. !d.§ 12102(2) (C). 
237. !d. 
238. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974). 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 200-10. 
240. See generaUy Amartya Sen, Editarial: Human Capital and Human Capability, 25 WORLD 
DEv. 1959 (1997) (explaining a technical term created by Amartya Sen for a function that 
can be achieved through a variety of alternative activities. Thus, the function of mobilizing 
can be competently achieved either through walking or by wheeling). 
241. Robert-L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of 
a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413,447-62 (1991). See also 
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own terms. Mter delineating disability through the terms bor-
rowed from the Rehabilitation Act, Title I extended its coverage to 
any qualified individual with disabilities, which it defined as those 
individuals who either with or without reasonable accommoda-
tions can perform the essential functions of a given job. 242 This last 
section from the ADA clearly demonstrates that Congress pre-
sumed certain disabled people were, either with or without 
accommodations, competent to work (and by extension, engage in 
other social functions). It could not then, in any sense, have 
equated the functional limitations which it delineated as defining 
the class with the characteristic of incompetence. So, contrary to 
the Cleburne Court, beyond the context of the Rehabilitation Act 
and statutes conferring similar special benefits, we may not pre-
sume that differences in abilities to perform life activities entail 
differences in abilities to cope with the world. 
Congress imported the Rehabilitation Act's three-prong defini-
tion of disability as a matter of political expediency. Regulations 
issued in 1977 by the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW) (now the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS)) specifically enumerated who was considered "handi-
capped" under the Rehabilitation Act's definition. 243 The extensive 
HEW regulations were utilized, fairly uniformly, by both agencies 
and courts enforcing the Rehabilitation Act.244 Thus, although leg-
islators excluded several controversial conditions from ADA 
coverage,245 incorporating the terms of the Rehabilitation Act was 
viewed as a quick and convenient way to delineate which individu-
als would come under the statute's auspices.246 Adopting the terms 
and usage from the Rehabilitation Act was not, however, an en-
dorsement of context, especially as it relates to the capabilities of 
the protected class. Thus, although social custom may view the 
terms as reflecting the competence of the protected group, Con., 
gress did not intend to endorse that custom when utilizing 
otherwise neutral language from the different context of the Re-
habilitation Act. 
Along with the wholesale importation of the definition of 
disability from the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA, Congress also 
Arlene Mayerson, Title 1-Empluyment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 U;MP. 
L. REv. 499 (1991). 
242. See supra text at notes 233-36. 
243. 45 C.F.R § 84.3 (2000). 
244. See Chai R Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disability, 7 LAB. 
LAW]. 11, 12-13 (1991). Feldblum was actively involved in negotiating aspects of the ADA. 
245. Among the excluded groups were homosexuals, transvestites, pedophiles, klepto-
maniacs, and exhibitionists. A comprehensive list is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994). 
246. See generaUy Burgdorf, supra note 182. 
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imported that statute's formulation of what comprises disability-
based discrimination. This was neither an obvious, nor an 
unopposed choice for Congress to have made. Dissatisfied with the 
scope of pre-ADA civil rights statutes affecting the disabled,247 
academic commentators248 and disability rights groups249 advocated 
amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act through addition of the term 
"handicapped" since the mid-1980s. The result of this emendation 
would have been protections against discrimination paralleling 
that of other groups, in other words, "on the basis of' having a 
disability, a formula utilized in some other disability-related 
antidiscrimination statutes250 This formulation would also have 
mirrored that applied to people covered by the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (Title VII).251 By contrast, the Rehabilitation Act (as well as a 
handful of statutes modeled after it) 252 requires that those 
individuals defined as having a disability must also satisfy a second 
requirement, that they be "qualified" individuals with disabilities. 253 
The Rehabilitation Act formulation requiring disabled plaintiffs to 
prove their qualifications was incorporated into Titles I and II of 
the ADA. 
The implication of this standard was substantial for judicial 
methodological (as well as practical pleading) purposes because, as 
247. See Janet Flaccus, Discrimination Legislation for the Handicapped: Much Ferment and 
Erosion of Coverage, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 81 (1986);Janet Flaccus, Handicap Discrimination Legis-
lation: With Such Inadequate Coverage at the Federal Level, Can State Legislation Be of Any Help?, 
40 ARK. L. REv. 261 (1986). 
248. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf & Christopher Bell, Eliminating Discrimination Against 
Physically and Mentally Handicapped Persons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL Dis-
ABILITY L. REP. 64 (1984). 
249. Most prominent was the National Council on the Handicapped's strong opposi-
tion to the Rehabilitation Act model: "Proof of class membership is not required under 
other types of nondiscrimination laws, and statutes guaranteeing equal opportunity for 
persons with disabilities need not have such a requirement either." NATIONAL CouNCIL ON 
THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 183, at A-25. 
250. Examples include the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability for 
the purposes of Foreign Service employment, 22 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(1) (1988); participation 
in any pursuit funded under the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, 15 
U.S.C.§ 3151(a) (1988); activities of labor organizations, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(4) (1988); and 
the sale or rental of housing, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (1)-(2) (1988). 
251. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994)). 
252. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1374(1) (1988) (prohibiting air carriers from discriminating 
against qualified individuals with handicaps). 
253. !d. A clear demonstration of this standard, as well as the circularity of its reason-
ing, can be seen in Southeastern Cmty. Colt. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 397 (1979), where the 
Court held that because a student with a profound hearing disorder could not be reasona-
bly accommodated in a clinical nurse training program, adverse actions taken against her 
could not be construed as disability discrimination because she was not an "otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual" under the terms of the statute. 
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a result of the inclusion of this requirement, disabled individuals 
have in practice been under a greater burden of beginning their 
prima facie assertions of Title I and II civil rights claims than have 
Title VII litigants. 
Both ADA claimants, because of the "qualified disabled" lan-
guage, and Title VII claimants, due to the Supreme Court's 
decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,254 are required under 
their respective burdens of production to plead prima facie cases 
of discrimination in order to avoid summary judgment. Neverthe-
less, while the Court held in McDonnell Douglas that the level 
required of women plaintiffs be "minimal," the parallel burden has 
in practice been much higher among ADA Title I plaintiffs. 
Empirical studies by Ruth Colker substantiate this point. Follow-
ing a report by the American Bar Association that employers 
prevailed in over ninety-two percent of Title I cases over the period 
1992-97,255 Colker created her own database of all Title I claims 
filed over this period.256 Colker concluded that under the ADA, 
"[c]ourts are abusing the summary judgment device" both by re-
fusing to send normative factual questions to juries as well as by 
"creating an impossibly high threshold of proof for defeating" 
summary judgment claims, including the burden of proving prima 
facie competence. 257 Colker has also examined appellate decisions, 
and found that the success rate of ADA appellants also pales in 
comparison to Title VII appellants.258 
As an example, if a woman with a doctorate in nuclear physics 
sues an employer after being denied a job as a nuclear physicist, 
the initial presumption under Title VII which this employer may or 
may not rebut is that she was discriminated against because of her 
sex.
259 By contrast, as has been empirically proven, the same job 
254. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
255. Study Finds Emplayers Win Most ADA Title I judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998). A subsequent study of 1998 
outcomes indicates that the employers' win rate increased to ninety-five percent. 
256. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants?, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99 (1999). 
257. Id. at 101-102. 
258. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO 
ST. LJ. 239 (2001). 
259. See generally TRIBE, supra note 121; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973). Views strongly diverge on McDonnell Douglas. Compare, for example, Deborah 
C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2237-
38 (1995) (arguing for the abandonment of McDonnell Douglas for a "less structured ap-
proach to disparate treatment cases"), with William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and 
Throwing Out Proof Structures: It is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTs. & 
EMP. PoL'Y]. 361 (1998) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas is still valuable for both structural 
and symbolic reasons). 
FALL 2001-WINTER 2002] Disability and the Suprmne Court 123 
applicant with a disability, while also having to assert her qualifica-
tions, would have a much more difficult time surviving summary 
judgment because of judicial presumption regarding her compe-
tence. The scenarios are the same, yet the initial juridical 
presumptions regarding competence are diametrically opposed. 
In sum, having first brought into the ADA welfarist notions of 
the disability classification through the adoption of the Rehabilita-
tion Act's definition of disability, Congress then further reinforced 
the Cleburne framework by adopting the Rehabilitation Act's re-
quirement that Title I and II claimants also prove their 
qualifications. Thus, although Congress very clearly intended to 
rebut the presumptions utilized by the Cleburne Court, and al-
though the ADA's defining language does not reference 
competence, because of poor drafting it unintentionally bolstered 
stereotypes of incompetence and the methodology which embeds 
such stereotypes in interpretations of the law. 
C. The Disability Classification 
There remains the question of the justice of reducing opportu-
nity for all of a class to protect some of its members or to protect 
the public from some of them. This is the fundamental question of 
when the state may reduce opportunities for all of a group as a 
strategy for constraining some of its members. To illustrate, the 
dissenting Justices in Goesart question whether there is arbitrary 
discrimination between male and female bar owners and the bur-
den the state's preventative measures place on the latter.260 While 
the former might be absent from their bars irresponsibly, leaving 
wives, daughters, and female employees "without such protecting 
oversight,"261 the latter are not free to tend their own bars nor em-
ploy their daughters to do so "even if a man is always present in the 
bl. h k d ,262 esta IS ment to eep or er. 
A seemingly logical, but ultimately fallacious, method of avoid-
ing the problem of categorically burdening members of the class is 
to make properties associated with dependency and disruptiveness 
definitive of the classification. To do so would mean that only de-
pendent or disruptive individuals would meet the definition for 
membership in the classification. Whoever does not display 
260. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 468 (1948) (Rutledge,J., dissenting). 
261. /d. at 466. 
262. /d. at 468. 
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dependency or disruptiveness would fall outside the classification 
and in theory would not be burdened by restrictions placed on the 
classification's population. 
If the class protected by the ADA is constructed this way, logic 
places asymptomatic individuals with HIV, for example, within the 
classification in view of the kinds of moral and social considera-
tions that weighed heavily in Bragdon, even if these are individuals 
who defer the disease's symptoms with medication. On the other 
hand, there are few if any similar moral and social problems asso-
ciated with individuals who mitigate their diabetic symptoms with 
medication, and these individuals fall outside the classification. 
Thus, the construction of the disability classification within the 
Cleburne framework appears able to exclude by stipulative defini-
tion people who are biologically anomalous but who are of a kind 
that presently does not present moral or social problems to the 
state. Drawing the classification this way makes the states' interest 
in special treatment of the class a logical certainty rather than an 
open empirical question. Arguably, maintaining the rationality of 
the state's interest in treating some citizens differently requires 
empirical proof that the state's characterizations of them are true. 
It follows that questions about whether the state has a rational 
interest in treating some citizens differently should not be resolved 
simply by stipulating class characteristics or acceding to customary 
characterizations, regardless of whether these truly describe most 
members of the class. 
Relying on stipulated characterizations of classes invites stereo-
typing the classes' members. Therefore, answers to such questions 
should be determined empirically by unbiased, systematic, com-
prehensive examination of facts about the class's extension. 
Interpretation of the disability classification should be subject to a 
similar fact-finding process, rather than to the stipulative method-
ology imposed by the Cleburne framework. The Goesart Court 
turned aside such appeal to fact about the classification of 
women.
263 Evidence adduced by exactly such fact-finding about 
women impelled the Cleburne Court to draw the line it did between 
gender and disability classifications. It drew this line because it 
took empirical evidence about the competence of women to be 
relevant to the female classification, but disregarded the relevance 
of empirical evidence of competence to the disability classification. 
For political reasons, neither Congress nor the political arm of 
the disability community has faced the question of whether the 
263. See discussion of Goesart sufrra Part I. 
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concept of disability has to have a univocal statutory meaning.264 
Only if it does must the class of people eligible for protection from 
discrimination aimed at their physical or mental anomalies be 
identical, or even intersect significantly, with the class of people 
who receive monetary benefits or special services from being classi-
fied as disabled. Almost no one asks whether the class of disabled 
eligible for special educational services should be identical to the 
class of disabled protected against exclusion from ordinary educa-
tional services. Clearly both the reasons and the methods for 
selective treatment for one purpose-compensating for dysfunc-
tion due to disability-are enormously different from the reasons 
for selective treatment for another purpose-protecting against 
discrimination due to disability. As the criteria for class member-
ship should be related to the purpose for which the class is 
delineated, there is no reason to think that the classes relevant to 
different types of legislation are identical, or reducible to one an-
other, even if it happens that their members are the same (they are 
extensionally equivalent). 
It is now well established that we tend to form categories around 
prototypical experiences of salient instances that serve as emblem-
atic of the categories. 265 That is to say, we take the properties of 
individuals who stand out in a category or capture our attention, 
and make these properties boundary markers of the entire cate-
gory, so that all its members are assumed to possess them. This 
cognitive tendency may be magnified when we imagine the most 
salient members of a category to be the most in need, or otherwise 
deserving of attention.266 So, in an era like our own that is 
264. A dispositive answer to this question is far beyond the ambition of this Article. 
Some initial takes on the matter are included in Part B of AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAw FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 87-162 (Leslie 
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). 
265. Eleonor Rosch, Principles ofCategorizatian, in CoGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27-
48 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978). 
266. The Court's discussion in Garrett illustrates how the salience of instances of great 
neediness captures attention even when they do not relate to the case in hand. In Garrett, 
the Court stipulated that it is rational to hire employees who can use existing facilities and 
to hold to "job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled." 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955, 959 (2000). The Court thus made remodeling facili-
ties and revising job qualifications emblematic of what it takes to give disabled people access 
to the workplace. 
However, when Director of Nursing Patricia Garrett attempted to return to work after 
treatment for breast cancer, she was "informed ... she would have to give up her Director 
position," id. at 961, even though having had breast cancer in no way diminished her quali-
fications or competence, nor did her illness affect her use of existing facilities. See id. 
Neither did prison guard Milton Ash, an asthmatic whose case was consolidated with 
Garrett's, seek facilities remodeling or job qualification allowances. See id. His physician 
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entranced with difference, justice may seem to require attention to 
the greatest differences that distinguish groups from one an-
other.267 The greatest gap that may seem to exist between people 
with and without disabilities is the distance between the latter's 
species-typical capability to function independently, and the inca-
pability and consequent dependence of the most dysfunctional 
members of the former group. Some may think that responses to 
disability are insensitive if they do not focus on the welfare of that 
subset of individuals in the disabled population who are most dys-
functional in the sense of having the least potential to function 
independently. 268 
recommended that he not be assigned to work in areas polluted with cigarette smoke and 
to drive cars with carbon monoxide leaking into the interior compartment. /d. Arguably, 
compliance with these recommendations required no "special" accommodation because 
the pollutants Ash sought to avoid were already prohibited by "no smoking" and vehicle 
maintenance standard regulations. Nevertheless, in determining the justice of Garrett's and 
Ash's claims to equality of treatment in the workplace, the Court took needs atypically 
greater than what is usual for the classification as paradigms. See id. at 958-69. 
267. Some theorists believe that dominant groups secure their identity and elicit soli-
darity by constructing negative accounts of the similarities among their members. Thus, 
whiteness "has no content but is rather a negation, the identity of not-being-black." Orlando 
Patterson, America's Wont Idea, N.Y. TIMES BooK REv., Oct. 22, 2000, 51, at 15 (reviewing 
Scorr L. MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD (2000)). Iris Marion Young also provides an 
analysis of abjection to explain why the majority of people treat individuals with disabilities 
as "other." IRIS MARION YOUNG, jUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, 141-48 (1990). 
Also of interest is David Mitchell's and Sharon Snyder's claim that the record of represent-
ing disability in the visual and literary media is a history of "metaphorical opportunism." 
David T. Mitchell & Sharon L. Snyder, Introduction: Disability Studies and the Double Bind of 
Representation, in THE BODY, IN THEORY: HISTORIES OF CULTURAL MATERIALISM 1, 17 (David 
T. Mitchell & Sharon L. Snyder eds., 1997). Mitchell and Snyder believe that there is a "per-
vasive cultural and artistic dependency upon disability," id. at 12, and they indict the culture 
for colonizing people with various kinds of impairments and exploiting their images in 
order to nourish nondisabled people's fictions about their own perfections. See id. at 15 
("Readers' experience of the dual pleasures of fascination and repulsion [with physical 
difference] also evolve out of an ability to leave the site of a fiction with our own member-
ship in normalcy further consolidated and assured."). However, for a critique of some of 
Mitchell & Snyder's theoretical claims, see Anita Silvers, From the Crooked Timher of Humanity, 
Beautiful Things Can be Made, in BEAUTY MATTERS: NEW THEORIES OF BEAUTY (Peg Zeglin 
Brand ed., 2000). Theories on which dominant group identities are constructed opposi-
tionally, based on denials of unfavorable attributes assigned to subordinate classifications, 
necessarily focus on salient differences, even if these do not truly characterize the minority 
groups' members. 
268. See generaUy HANS S. REINDERS, THE FUTURE OF THE DISABLED IN LIBERAL Soci-
ETY: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (2000). Reinders argues that tension exists between genetic 
screening used to give parents the option of terminating a pregnancy upon the discovery of 
a genetic defect and the view we have as members of a society towards disabled citizens. Part 
of the weighing process used to decide whether to have a child with a genetic defect is to 
imagine living with a disabled child, which requires making a judgment on the value of a 
disabled person. Id. See also ROBERT M. 'VEATCH, THE FOUNDATIONS OF jUSTICE: WHY THE 
RETARDED AND THE REsT OF Us HAvE CLAIMS TO EQUALITY (1986) (arguing for an egalitar-
ian response to the needs of the disabled, grounding the approach in both religious and 
secular premises). 
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There is, then, an understandable inclination to imagine the 
main usage of the disability classification to be in support of the 
state's interest in responding to these members' special needs. But 
the most conspicuous differences are not always the fairest markers 
of the boundaries between groups. Further, only if the groups are 
logically identical, rather then merely contingently intersecting, 
can it be fair to visit burdens on members of one group as the 
price of benefits allocated to members of the other group. 
IV. REVISING THE DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION 
We demonstrated above that the methodology utilized by the 
Supreme Court in conceptualizing the disability classification is 
retrogressive, closely analogous to the one it applied to women 
more than fifty years ago in Goesart. 269 We also illustrated how the 
framework annunciated in Cleburne perpetuated differential 
treatment under the law of people with disabilities based upon 
custom and convention, rather than upon an empirical enquiry 
about what is factual. 270 We now turn to the question of what kind 
of change would be required to amend the Court's incongruent 
jurisprudence and achieve methodological consistency in the 
mode of analysis it applies to groups of biologically different 
individuals. 
As a matter of logical consistency and judicial conservatism, the 
Court could hold that when examining statutes or practices affect-
ing the disabled as a group, courts ought to proceed from the 
same baseline utilized for assessing the rights of women. As a prac-
tical matter, this would entail an initial presumption that the 
prevalent characteristic of members of the disability classification is 
their competence to perform the social function at issue, with a 
sub-category of individuals within the classification who will be un-
able to so function. This presumption will either be borne out or 
disproved by empirical evidence when particular state actions are 
challenged. 
We do not, therefore, argue for the abolition of "rational" dis-
crimination, nor of classification on the basis of characteristics that 
act as proxy where there are not empirical indicators of those 
269. See supra Parts I and II. 
270. See supra Part II. 
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characteristics.271 What we take issue with is the selection of proxy 
characteristics based upon empirically unfounded stereotypes272 
that lead to the general exclusion of all people with disabilities,273 
regardless of competence or qualification. We urge that generali-
zations about whether the disabled, as distinct from a carefully 
drawn and substantiated sub-category of the classification are bio-
logically unable to perform particular social functions, should be 
grounded in an empirical analysis rather than reliant upon social 
convention. 
To adopt this approach fits comfortably with the judicial conser-
vatism typifying the majority of current Justices, for it imposes 
methodological consistency on the Court's treatment of groups 
that are candidates for constitutional protection from discrimina-
tion. Nor would application of this standard require the Court to 
engage in dramatic social engineering, for the only current prac-
tice that would not prevail would be that founded on empirically 
unproven generalizations and stereotypes about the disabled. 
Adopting a constitutionally neutral disability classification that 
does not stipulate its members' incompetence, and therefore does 
not make the benefits of differential treatment based on the classi-
fication presumptive, would jettison outmoded ideas about the 
disabled on the same basis that prompted the Cleburne Court to 
jettison outmoded ideas about women. 
Unless the Court does so, judicial consideration of disabled 
people will be mired in circularity. Applied to the disability 
classification, the methodology we recommend would ensure that 
judicial examinations of whether disabled individuals are 
biologically able to execute particular social functions are not 
271. See generaUy, GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971) 
(seminal trealment of the effects of discrimination, written by a Nobel Prize winning 
economist). 
272. Unfounded labor productivity assumptions are discussed in Michael Ashley Stein, 
Market Failure and ADA Title I, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 193 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Sil-
vers eds., 2000). See generaUy, Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Part ll-Patents and Innuvations in Assistive Technology, 12 NoTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pus. PoL'Y 9, 85-89 (1998) (recognized as the seminal work on ac-
commodation costs); Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitude, Behavior, and the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345 (1997) (explor-
ing the concept of accommodation costs); Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I-Workplace Accommodations, 46 
DEPAUL L. REv. 887 (1997) (same). 
273. This is so, even when the authors attempt what they perceive to be a pro-disability 
rights position. See, e.g., Scott A Moss & Daniel A Malin, Public Funding For Disability Accom11U}-
dations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARv. C.R-
C.L. L. REv. 197, 200--01 ( 1998); Sue A Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEx. 
L. REv. 1969, 1975--78 (1994). 
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mere reflections of precisely those constrictive conventions or 
customs whose truth plaintiffs with disabilities are trying to 
challenge at trial. Such a methodological adjustment will not result 
in special protections for the disabled but will simply extend the 
same protections against biased characterization granted to other 
groups that historically have been deprived of opportunity by the 
conventionalization of false beliefs about them. 
We argue that such rigorous reconstruction of the disability clas-
sification is required to avoid the artificial imposition of limitations 
implicit in categorizations devised for narrow legislative purposes 
from being mistaken for natural constraints on the potential and 
freedom of people with disabilities. The practical effects of realiz-
ing the kind of methodological consistency we are urging can be 
illustrated by a comparison of the influence of the Cleburne doc-
trine in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.274 with what 
might change were a Cleveland decision developed within a neutral 
framework. 
In Cleveland, the Court settled a growing inter-circuit conflice75 
arising from circumstances in which disabled individuals claimed 
statutory protections under the differing definitions of disability 
contained in the ADA and the Social Security System.276 At issue 
was whether the assertion, made for the purposes of receiving So-
cial Security Disability Income (SSDI), that a person was 
completely disabled from working277 precluded the same individual 
from later asserting in an ADA complaint that she was a work ca-
pable (and thus qualified) person with a disability.278 The Court 
held, unanimously, that disabled plaintiffs were under a burden of 
showing that their work dysfunctions (which made them eligible 
for public benefits) could be nullified by ADA-mandated reason-
able accommodations.279 
The Court found that the ADA and SSDI classifications were not 
co-extensive, but merely overlapping. 280 The Court further found 
that an "SSA representation of total disability differs from a purely 
factual statement."281 Nevertheless, Carolyn Cleveland was placed 
under a burden of constructing an explanation, sufficient to meet 
274. 526 u.s. 795 (1999). 
275. See id. at 800. 
276. See generally Anne E. Beaumont, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: judicial Estoppel and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1529 (1996). 
277. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797. 
278. /d. 
279. /d. at 798, 806. 
280. /d. at 803. 
281. /d. at 802. 
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a reasonable juror standard, of the discrepancy between her decla-
ration of eligibility for disability benefits granted to those whose 
impairments make them too dysfunctional to work and her decla-
ration of being able to work if reasonable adjustments to work sites 
or practices were made. By extrapolation, a similar burden would 
be borne by other people with disabilities who can be productive 
under appropriate working conditions, but not under the barrier-
ridden conditions maintained by their current employers. 
Yet it is unclear as to why these individuals are required to carry 
such a burden at the summary judgment level.282 Why should they 
carry the burden of explaining away presumptive inconsistencies 
when the Court's own analysis shows that the claims at issue are 
not inconsistent? According to the Court, the first claim, on which 
disability is equivalent to the inability to work, refers to an adminis-
trative classification and often is determined to be true as a matter 
of definitional convention.283 The second claim, on which disability 
is not equivalent to the inability to work, refers purely to facts 
about a particular person's competences and is always determined 
to be true as a matter of empirical observation and demonstration 
rather than definitional convention. As on the Court's own analysis 
these claims make logically different kinds of attributions and 
mean different things in their references to disability, 284 the logical 
conclusion of the Court's holding should be that no burden exists 
on the plaintiff to prove that she did not contradict herself. This is 
borne out by its ruling that the claim to be a member of the SSDI 
disability classification is not a claim about being disabled in fact, 
but is instead a claim about satisfYing a certain procedure. Thus, 
on the Court's own analysis, the claim that one is ADA-eligible is a 
factual one, but the claim that one is SSDI eligible is a contextu-
ally-related legal construction. They are no more contradictory 
than saying "I am tall and green," as opposed to saying "I am red 
all over and green all over." 
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer reasoned that Cleveland 
could in fact be eligible under the ADA because a reasonable ac-
commodation could enable her to prove competence.285 But it 
would not be in the state's interest to have to make determina-
tions, for each of the 2.5 million annual seekers of various SSA 
benefits, about whether there are specific accommodations that 
might enable that individual to work. 286 More than sixty percent of 
282. See id. at 798. 
283. /d. at 804. 
284. /d. at 801-07. 
285. /d. at 803. 
286. /d. 
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the decisions that individuals cannot work at all, and therefore are 
disabled for SSDI purposes, are made because the applicant has a 
condition that the SSA lists as disabling, even though people with 
these conditions may participate successfully in the workforce. 287 
Despite the nonfactual basis of the disability classification for pur-
poses of SSDI, Cleveland affirmed that courts should therefore 
defer to this proxy for work incapability. Thus, while explicitly rec-
ognizing that the class of disabled people referred to by the ADA is 
not factually co-extensive with the class eligible to depend on dis-
ability benefits, the Court decided that the ADA definition of 
disability should be viewed as stipulatively coextensive with SSA 
classifications, with the burden falling on individual litigants to 
prove otherwise in particular cases.288 
What results from this stipulation of counterfactual coextensiv-
ity? Under this holding, members of the class of people with 
biological anomalies are faced with a preponderance of burdens 
over benefits, for they are individually placed under the onus of 
proving competence, rather than having this presumption made in 
their favor. With its Cleveland ruling, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its commitment to the Cleburne framework which postulates a class 
of disabled individuals who cannot effectively function in society, 
with an ancillary sub-class who can. In contrast, the methodologi-
cally consistent approach that we advocate would have compelled 
the Supreme Court in Cleveland to presume that individuals claim-
ing equal protection from discrimination under the ADA are 
competent, unless employers or others could show that they really 
were not. This presumption is reflective of known facts about the 
class in question. 
Quantitative examination of current definitions of disability util-
ized by the state for social welfare programs allocating disability 
benefits, and for legal protections such as the ADA, produces a 
chart constituted by overlapping Venn circles rather than a mutu-
ally inclusive classification. From an empirical perspective, the class 
of people who receive benefits from various state operated pro-
grams (such as SSI or vocational rehabilitation), and the class of 
people with biological anomalies usually identified as "disabled" at 
times overlap, but are not coterminous. At present, the Census Bu-
reau classifies nearly twenty percent of Americans, or some 54 
287. !d. at 804. 
288. See id. at 805-06. 
132 University of Michigan Journal of Law Ref arm [VoL. 35:1&2 
million people, as having some kind of disability.289 At the same 
time, the number of individuals with disabilities receiving disability 
payments based on their own disability was 9.1 million as of De-
cember 1999.290 Although some adjustment must be made to 
harmonize the samples so that their cohorts are coterminous, what 
is clear is that these two figures are neither equal nor coextensive, 
the overall disability figure eclipsing the benefits figure. 
This categorical overlap, i.e., the existence of some portion of 
people with disabilities receiving social benefits for a state-
acknowledged inability to work who are functionally capable of 
working, has been well documented.291 At the forefront of empiri-
cal findings is research emanating from the Cornell Rehabilitation 
Research and Training Center for Economic Research on Em-
ployment Policy for Persons with Disabilities.292 In sum, the 
findings of economists funded by the Center demonstrate that the 
poor business cycle of the early 1990s, in combination with the 
protected nature of SSI/SSDI recipients during the concurrent 
welfare reforms, and favorable health benefits provided under 
those public assistance programs, induced disabled individuals to 
forego entering the labor market. 293 What is crucial to this analysis 
is the factual existence of a "transfer population": individuals with 
289. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep"t of Commerce, Census Brief 97-5, Disabilities Affect 
One-Fifth of All Americans, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/ 
cenbr975.pdf. 
290. /d. 
291. Neither the general public nor the disability community takes sufficient care to 
distinguish between disability benefits and reasonable accommodations. The former consti-
tute differential treatment to compensate disabled people for their personal limitations. 
The latter constitute equal treattnent to indemnify disabled people against social limita-
tions. To illustrate, for several years San Francisco airport was required to charge the lower 
long-term parking lot fees to drivers with disabilities who parked in the short-term parking 
lot. This was an accommodation made because the shuttles from the long-term parking lot 
were not wheelchair accessible. The solution was unsatisfactory, however, because many of 
the drivers classified as disabled did not use wheelchairs and were capable of using existing 
shuttles. Here, holding a disabled parking placard was made a proxy for the disability classi-
fication but this created an overinclusive classification and exposed all members to lengthy 
eligibility checks. The problem finally was resolved with the purchase of wheelchair accessi-
ble long-term parking shuttles and the consequent elimination of the need to 
accommodate long-term disabled parkers in the short-term lot. 
292. The website and research papers are available online at http:// 
www.ilr.cornell.edu/ rrtc/. 
293. See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser et al., How Policy Variables Influence the Timing of Slr 
cial Security Disability Insurance Applications, Richard V. Burkhauser et al., How Working Agt~ 
People With Disabilities Fared Over the 1990's Business Cycle; David C. Stapleton et al., Transitions 
from AFDC to SSI Prior to Welfare Reform; David C. Stapleton & Adam F. Tucker, WiU Expanding 
Health Care Coverage For People With Disabilities Increase Their Empluyment and Earnings? Evidence 
From An Analysis of the SSI Work Incentive Program. These papers are all available at 
http:/ /www.ilr.cornell.edu/ped/dep/rrtc.html. 
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disabilities who were employable, but nonetheless remained eligi-
ble for SSI/SSDI benefits under those programs' definitions.294 
The category of individuals with disabilities receiving public as-
sistance who are functionally capable of working was recognized by 
national policymakers in passage of the Ticket to Work and Work 
Incentives Improvement Act, which extended the length of time 
that people with disabilities receiving public assistance could con-
tinue to receive health care coverage after obtaining gainful 
employment.295 Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the ADA, 
on july 26, 2000, the Clinton Administration announced a series of 
policy initiatives intended to allow people with disabilities cur-
. rently receiving Social Security disability-related benefits to earn 
more income without losing cash benefits.296 It is reasonable to 
suppose that further empirical study will show similar results for 
more specialized disability benefits programs. It is also reasonable 
to suppose that the majority of individuals who find themselves 
identified with the disability classification do not benefit from this 
assignment. 
Had the Court pursued a fact-based enquiry about the part of 
the population reported to be identified as disabled in the Census, 
it would have discovered several bases for the logical disconnect 
between the disability classification that has burdened people clas-
sified as disabled, and the disability classification emanating from 
state activities that offer material benefits to people classified as 
disabled. First, statutory definitions of "disability" vary among state 
and federal definitions. 297 Second, many disabled people acquired 
294. Anticipating this result, economists Maijorie Baldwin and Richard Burkhauser 
have been critical of the ADA and its lack of workplace initiatives. See Maijorie L. Baldwin, 
Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. AcAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 37 
(1997); Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Am Pef1Jle with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 
ANNALS AM. AcAo. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 71 (1997). 
295. Section 202(a), for example, extends Medicare coverage for SSDI recipients re-
turning to work to six and one-half years. See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives 
Improvement Act ofl999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999). 
296. Full details of the increase in the allowable substantial gainful activity level (SGA) 
under SSDI and SSI are set forth in a White House press release. See Press Release, White 
House, Clinton-Gore Administration Announces New Action Promoting Home and Com-
munity Based Services and Housing Options for People with Disabilities (July 25, 2000), 
available at http:/ /www.pub.whitehouse.gov/ uri-res/12R?um:pdi:/ /oma.eop.gov.us/2000/ 
7 /25/10.text.l. Further information on SGA and trial work period changes are available 
through the Social Security Administration's website at http:/ /www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/ 
newsga.htm. 
297. These are laid out in Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled: Removing judicial 
Roadblocks that Prroent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protec-
tion, 26 HoFSTRA L. REv. 377 (1997). Their intersection, as well as a pre-Cleveland proposal 
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their disabilities after the times of life when participation in dis-
ability programs, such as special education, was appropriate.298 
Third, many disabled people maintain employment free of in-
volvement with vocational rehabilitation services. Fourth, and most 
pertinently, neither degree nor kind of biological anomaly deter-
mines productivity and other competencies.299 Two individuals may 
have identical physical limitations. One of them may be designated 
incapable of employment and thus is classified as disabled for pur-
poses of receiving income support, while the other, identically 
disabled as far as vulnerability to disability discrimination goes, 
holds a job and thus is not classified as disabled for purposes of 
receiving income support. 
Accordingly, an empirical examination by the Cleveland Court 
into the characteristics of members of the disability classification 
would have resulted in a holding grounded in the fact that people 
with disabilities as a class are capable of engaging in the social 
·function of work, even if a subset categorically are not. When 
Cleveland and others like her assert membership in an administra-
tively defined SSA disability classification, they would be 
understood as claiming to conform to one of the designations of 
biological anomaly stipulated by the SSA as entitling entry into the 
classification. 300 As well, they would be presumed to contend their 
inability to perform their own jobs, or others for which they are 
qualified, not categorically but under contingently existing work-
place conditions. Because the ADA construes failure to change 
certain kinds of exclusionary conditions as discriminatory, ADA 
plaintiffs' burden of proof at trial usually is in regard to the rea-
sonableness of accommodating their biological anomalies by 
changing such conditions. Thus, ADA plaintiffs also contend the 
inability to perform their jobs under existing workplace condi-
tions, but not categorically. They make a further claim, not at issue 
in regard to SSA classifications, about the reasonableness of alter-
ing certain of the conditions that currently obtain in a specific 
workplace. 
for how to reconcile potential conflicts, is set forth in Beaumont, This Estoppel Has Got to 
Stop: judicial Estoppel and the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 276. 
298. For example, 52.5% of people become disabled after the age of 65, 18.7% from 
ages 15 through 64. These, as well as additional facts regarding the age of 'onslaught" of 
disability are set forth by the Census Bureau, and are available online at 
http:/ /www.census.gov /prod/3/97pubs/ cenbr975.pdf. 
299. For a discussion of current economic assumptions about productivity, see Michael 
Ashley Stein, Labar Markets, Rationality, and Workerl with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 314 (2000). 
300. To prove her general inability to work under SSA procedures, Cleveland simply 
addressed "the extent of her injuries." Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799. 
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Contrary to the Cleveland Court, ADA plaintiffs should in the 
main be permitted to ignore their previous SSDI contentions, yet 
survive summary judgment motions. First, there is no inconsistency 
in principle between SSDI eligibility contentions and ADA reason-
able accommodation contentions. Second, by extending the 
Cleburne framework, the Cleveland decision has bolstered categori~ 
cal presumptions against the competence of disabled individuals. 
This raises a public policy consideration, for employers encour-
aged by such legal presumptions may take a worker's biological 
anomaly as a proxy that permits or invites expulsion from the 
workplace. 
V. CONCLUSION: DISABILITY CLASSIFICATIONS 
AND NATURAL KINDS 
An often voiced criticism of the Court's constitutional jurispru-
dence is that it illegitimately converts legal categories into "natural 
kinds."g01 That is, the Court is thought to take as "natural" fact the 
deficiencies of certain groups of people who are subject to disad-
vantageous statutory treatment and to suppose that they are of a 
kind naturally deserving of such burdens. The criticism is that such 
assertions do not refer to independent facts but instead are expres-
sions prompted by cultural lacks and biases. To illustrate, 
Amsterdam and Bruner comment that "[a] 'cripple' becomes a 
less natural category to the extent that prosthetic technologies be-
come available; it is a particularly natural category when a culture 
not only lacks technological resources but regards physical afflic-
tions as punishments for one's misbehavior in a prior life."g02 
Our analysis indicates that this criticism may not be completely 
on target. A kind is natural if it exists independent of human classi-
ficatory processes. That is, natural kinds are described rather than 
defined. The properties of any natural kind are a matter of fact, to 
be determined through the empirical study of that kind. The 
Court's retrogressive methodology in the wrongly decided and 
problematic cases we have examined was the opposite of what we 
would expect if the classifications at issue were being treated as 
natural kinds. The Court viewed legislative or administrative stipu-
lation or definition, not empirical study, as the decisive factor in 
301. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 232, at 50, 247. See also MINOW, MAKING ALL 
THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 106. 
302. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 232, at 50. 
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these cases in determining the properties of members of the class 
under consideration. Thus, the Court was led to characterize the 
larger group of people with disabilities in terms of properties 
drawn from the stipulated definition of disability embedded in wel-
farist legislation rather than in terms of properties verified by 
open-minded empirical study. 
We recognize that reconceiving the disability classification as an 
empirical category is not a simple task. Like general facts about 
other empirical kinds, what is generally true of disabled people 
evolved historically as physical and social conditions changed over 
time. To learn these truths requires careful empirical study of the 
capabiliti~s of disabled people today. Yet to respect these truths 
and stimulate the learning process, the Court need only commit 
itself to the principle that empirical reality overrides stipulative 
convention. 
